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TRADEMARK LAW AND THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF TRUST: CREATING THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ONLINE IDENTITY 
BETH SIMONE NOVECK* 
ABSTRACT 
Trust is the foundation of society for without trust, we cannot 
cooperate. Trust, in turn, depends upon secure, reliable, and persistent 
identity. Cyberspace is thought to challenge our ability to build trust 
because the medium undermines the connection between online 
pseudonym and offline identity. We have no assurances of who stands 
behind an online avatar; it may be one person, it may be more, it may be a 
computer. The legal debate to date has focused exclusively on the question 
of how to maintain real world identity in cyberspace. But new “social 
software” technology that enables communities from eBay to Amazon 
collectively to rate their members is giving rise to meaningful reputation 
in an online context. To determine what rules should govern online 
reputation and the use of such reputational data, we should look not only 
to constitutional, copyright, or tort law, but to trademark, the area of 
doctrine most closely analogous. Trademarks are a collaborative creation 
made by the source of the mark and the buying public, which associates 
the mark with that source. The public’s interest in the mark circumscribes 
the property rights of the individual holder. By reasoning from trademark 
theory to create a new set of rules for online reputation we create 
incentives for the social construction of trust in cyberspace. One key 
consequence of this approach is the conclusion that in order to produce 
reliable and persistent online identity, past reputational data should be 
preserved, transparent, and widely shared. 
The aim of virtual communities is the common good of its [sic] 
citizenry, from which arise the rights of avatars. Foremost among 
these rights is the right to be treated as people and not as 
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disembodied, meaningless, soulless puppets. Inherent in this right 
are therefore the natural and inalienable rights of man. These rights 
are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression. 
—Raph Koster, Declaration of the Rights of Avatars1 
If there is no permanent individuality, who gives you monks your 
robes and food, lodging and medicines? And who makes use of 
them? Who lives a life of righteousness, meditation and reaches 
Nirvana? Who destroys living beings, steals, fornicates, tells lies, or 
drinks spirits?...If your fellow monks call you Nagasena, what then 
is Nagasena? Would you say that your hair is Nagasena? Or your 
nails, teeth, skin, or other parts of your body, or the outward form, 
or sensation, or perception, or the psychic constructions, or 
consciousness? Are any of these Nagasena? Are all these taken 
together Nagasena? Or anything other than they? 
—The Milindapanha (Questions of King Nenander)2 
Colin Hepburn of Beaumont, Texas plays online videogames in his 
spare time. He enjoys Anarchy Online, City of Heroes, Shadowbane, and 
other popular titles.3 Once he tires of a game and something more exciting 
hits the shelves at Christmas, Colin leaves one game community to join 
another. After all, it is not only time consuming but costly to pay 
subscription fees to more than one online service. 
When he wanted to leave Sony’s Everquest 2 for World of Warcraft, 
the hugely popular new interactive game from Blizzard Entertainment, 
Colin did as he had done before: he listed his “avatar,” or online character, 
for sale on eBay, the way one would sell an old stuffed animal in a garage 
sale. Around the same time as Colin put his “Level 25 Kerra Bruiser” on 
eBay for sale under the heading, “EQ2 Game with Extras,” Sony Online 
Entertainment, the publishers of Everquest 2, launched “Station 
Exchange,” a commercial website for the sale and trade in virtual goods 
 1. Raph Koster, A Declaration of the Rights of Avatars (Aug. 27, 2000), http://raphkoster.com/ 
gaming/playerrights.shtml. 
 2. PANKAJ MISHRA, AN END TO SUFFERING: THE BUDDHA IN THE WORLD 25 (2004) (adapting 
THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA 43–44 (T.W. Rhys Davids trans., Motilal Banarasidass 1965) 
(1890)). 
 3. Anarchy Online, http://www.anarchy-online.com/ (last visited July 6, 20005); City of Heroes, 
http://www.cityofheroes.com (last visited July 6, 2005); Shadowbane, http://www.shadowbane.com/ 
us/index.php (last visited July 6, 2005).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/2
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from Sony’s videogames, including swords, armor, clothing, and avatars. 
Sony’s terms of service prohibit sales in other markets.4 
Sony demanded that eBay suspend Colin’s auction. It claimed that 
Colin was selling intellectual property that belonged to Sony. The Kerra 
Bruiser avatar, though designed and brought to life by Colin and the 
identity he assumed over several months of play in Everquest, was, 
according to the terms of the Everquest user agreement, the property of 
Sony Online Entertainment Inc. eBay, consistent with its Verified Rights 
Owners Program (VeRO)5 and the terms of its own subscriber contract, 
acceded to Sony’s request and took down Colin’s auction. After Colin 
tried to re-list his auction, eBay terminated Colin’s eBay account and, with 
it, eight years of stellar reputation ratings,6 the feedback evaluations given 
by buyers to a good seller in the eBay marketplace.7 Future buyers rely 
heavily on reputation when deciding whether to transact across long 
distances with an unknown seller.8 Reputation points are gold on eBay and 
without them, Colin’s ability to sell, not simply virtual goods, but the 
contents of his basement, is severely impeded. He was distraught.9 
 4. Terms of Service, http://sonyonline.com/tos/tos.jsp. 
 5. Verified Rights Owners Program, http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/vero_aboutme. 
html. 
 6. For a description of eBay’s rating system, see Evaluating a Member’s Reputation, 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/evaluating-feedback.html (last visited July 28, 2005). 
 7. Galit Sarfaty summarizes how the eBay system works: 
The case of the eBay auction site provides an example of how reputation is established 
through an online rating system. One can think of eBay as a series of repeated transactions. 
eBay’s auction site uses what it calls a feedback mechanism between buyers and sellers where 
participants can rate each other and provide written comments. The highest bidder of an item 
sends the seller money and trusts that the seller will the ship the item and that the item is of 
the quality promised by the seller. On eBay, a seller builds her reputation by honestly 
carrying out her transactions. If a seller cheats a buyer, she may likely receive a negative 
rating (–1 and negative comments), which would presumably hurt the seller’s chances of 
selling anything in the future. The incentive to act honestly and strive for a good reputation 
comes from the very fact that the seller is likely using the eBay site repeatedly and engaging 
in many transactions. 
Galit Sarfaty, On-Line Rating System for Rulemaking (2005) (unpublished paper, on file with author). 
 8. See Peter Kollock, The Production of Trust in Online Markets, in 16 ADVANCES IN GROUP 
PROCESSES 99 (E.J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne & H.A. Walker eds., 1999). 
Separating the two sides of the transaction by time or space (such as purchasing something by 
mail or on credit) introduces greater risks: the party who moves second must be considered 
trustworthy or have some other form of guarantee. The formal infrastructure that exists to 
manage these risks is vast and includes such elements as credit card companies, credit rating 
services, public accounting firms, and—if the exchange goes bad—such service as collection 
agencies or the court system. 
Id. 
 9. In an extreme example of the type of distress caused by online loss, a Legend of Mir 3 player 
killed a man who sold the player’s magic sword while on loan. See Chinese Online Gamer Gets Life 
for Murder, MSNBC, June 8, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8143073/; Mike Slocombe, Legend 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Colin’s story raises two legal questions: (1) should he be able to sell his 
Everquest avatar; and (2) should eBay be allowed to terminate his identity 
and associated reputation? These highlight a fundamental dilemma of the 
digital age—one that will be increasingly urgent to address as we move 
from the two-dimensional, text-based “web world” to more interactive, 
immersive and life-like social cyberspaces where a greater range of social 
interaction becomes possible10—the legal treatment of online identity. 
How should the law promote and protect the development of robust, 
persistent online identity? In any medium, social cooperation depends on 
trust.11 We need signals of commitment to support cooperative behavior.12 
Traditionally, we rely on face-to-face mechanisms for creating trust and 
producing useful signals of social commitment. When new 
communications technologies change the nature of social interaction, our 
institutions adjust to account for the loss of these signals.13 For example, in 
the nineteenth century the law of defamation evolved from a protection for 
personal honor and dignity into a property right in business reputation. 
This more explicit legal protection was intended to shore up the absence of 
face-to-face measures14 of identity and reputation necessary for 
commercial transactions. Cyberspace, by facilitating interaction 
independent of geography or physical space or place, changes how we 
engage in social relations.15 Initially, we assumed that cyberspace only 
creates a problem for identity formation insofar as it undermines our 
of Mir 3 Gamer Killed After Selling Virtual Sword, DIGITAL-LIFESTYLES.INFO, Mar. 31, 2005, 
http://digital-lifestyles.info/display_page.asp?section=business&id=2061.  
 10. See Beth Simone Noveck, Democracy: The Videogame, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW AND 
VIRTUAL WORLDS (Jack Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., forthcoming 2006) (in this essay I 
distinguish between the second generation “web world” and the forthcoming third generation “virtual 
world” with its immersive and three dimensional interfaces and socio-technical characteristics that are 
more conducive to collective action and socialization). 
 11. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (In his classic work, 
Axelrod writes “[T]he very possibility of achieving stable mutual cooperation depends upon there 
being a good chance of a continuing interaction” because it is through repeat play that trust is 
developed.). 
 12. See Oliver R. Goodenough, Law and the Biology of Commitment, in EVOLUTION AND THE 
CAPACITY FOR COMMITMENT 262 (Randolph M. Nesse ed., 2001). 
 13. For example, in contemporary society we rely on regulated ratings agencies to substitute for 
personal measures of trust in the marketplace. See, e.g., ratings agencies such as Experian, 
http://www.experian.com/ (last visited July 11, 2005); Transunion, http://www.transunion.com (last 
visited July 11, 2005); Equifax, http://www.equifax.com (last visited July 11, 2005). 
 14. See Paul A. David, From Keeping “Nature’s Secrets” to the Institutionalization of “Open 
Science”, in CODE: COLLABORATIVE OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 85, 92 (Rishab Aiyer 
Ghosh ed., 2005) (David describes the “institutionalization of reputation-building proceedings” in 
post-Renaissance Europe “which turned upon the revelation of scientific knowledge and expertise 
among extended reference groups that included peer-experts.”). 
 15. See Noveck, supra note 10, at 257–82. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/2
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ability to link online identity to offline identity. If we now want to 
promote the development of a robust, persistent on-line society, we need 
to consider the role the law should play in fostering the creation of reliable 
and distinct identity in online spaces.16 
Our conversation in cyberlaw to date has focused on how offline-
identity translates in the new medium. We have discussed how to apply 
constitutional, copyright, defamation, and other doctrines to connect 
online to offline identity. We pass legislation aimed at piercing the veil of 
cyberspace to get at the “real” person behind the online one.17 We are 
pursuing technical strategies to do the same.18 Yet we collaborate online 
without meeting face-to-face and as we spend more time online, we ought 
to be concerned with building up online identity itself.19 We are familiar 
with legal personhood for corporations, but absent from our scholarly legal 
conversation to date has been any attention paid to the legal treatment of 
online reputation as distinct from offline. 
While we may or may not be able to tie offline and online identity 
together, we can more effectively create real identity—and reputation—
online. It does not always matter who I am in real life. I can be someone 
equally real on America Online (AOL) or eBay or Everquest. We can use 
the graphical, networked screen to create vivid, visual representations of 
personal identity—an avatar—independent of our offline attributes. At the 
same time we can create context-specific reputations in online 
communities independent of social identity in real space. New software 
tools make it possible for the communities of which we are a part to create 
that reputation collectively through rating, ranking, and public feedback 
mechanisms. It is the eBay community that created Colin’s reputation. 
Rating systems20—or what we term “social software”—allow us to form 
 16. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 145–46 (1984) (Axelrod posits 
that the evolution of cooperation depends upon social structures including reputation and labels.). 
 17. The most recent of these prohibitions against cyberspatial anonymity is the so-called E-
Annoy Law, which amends 47 U.S.C. § 223 to impose criminal penalties upon anyone who sends an 
anonymous communication with an “intent to annoy,” including via e-mail. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2000). 
 18. See, e.g., Doug Beizer, Defense Unit, IT Federation Collaborate on Identity System, GCN, 
Feb. 9, 2006 (on defense department agreement with IT companies to establish employee 
authentication system). 
 19. Yuki Noguchi, Self 2.0: Internet Users Put a Best Face Forward, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 
2005, at A1 (citing Nielsen-NetRatings that the average American spends 80 hours per month online at 
work and 30 at home). 
 20. See Paul Resnick et al., Reputation Systems, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Dec. 2000, at 
45, 46 (“Reputation systems seek to establish the shadow of the future to each transaction by creating 
an expectation that other people will look back on it. The connections among such people may be 
significantly weaker than in transactions on a town’s Main Street, but their numbers are vast in 
comparison. At eBay, for example, a stream of buyers interacts with the same seller. They may never 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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relationships across physical distance, as Colin has done in Everquest and 
on eBay, while, at the same time, having the benefit of persistent and 
reliable identity in a given group. 
As a result of our focus on the legal rules to connect offline identity to 
online identity and little concomitant attention to the question of how to 
treat online identity per se, we lack clear answers to the questions posed 
above. We have not addressed whether and how to ensure that online 
identity will remain persistent over time. We lack mechanisms to ensure 
the integrity of reputation within a given online community. We lack the 
mechanisms to protect the rights of the communities in the reputations that 
they collectively create. 
The default rule is that the owner of the software platform on which the 
identity is created is the “owner” of that identity. But in a social software 
environment of collaborative creativity and interaction,21 where 
representation is malleable and reputation created by the community, we 
need a view of identity that moves away from this property-centric 
approach. We need to think about online reputation in such a way as to 
recognize the interests of the collective as well as of the individual in the 
way identity is constructed in online environments. If eBay is allowed to 
own, alter, and delete my reputation despite the fact that the community 
created it, there is little assurance that we will be able to develop robust 
and persistent identities in cyberspace. Moreover, if eBay is allowed to use 
intellectual property protections to limit the portability of reputation, this 
will create a disincentive to investing in goodwill within any given 
community. The eBay reputation score or the collaborative filtering 
preferences of a group of Amazon users about buying decisions are a 
signaling mechanism for successful collective action. Merely because that 
reputation depends on software tools for its articulation should not give 
rise to an exclusive property right for the platform owner without regard 
for the needs of the group. 
buy an item from the seller again, but by sharing their opinions about the seller via the Feedback 
Forum, they construct a meaningful history of the seller.”); see also Peter Kollock, The Production of 
Trust in Online Markets, in 16 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES at 99 (E.J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. 
Thyne & H.A. Walker eds., 1999); Paul Resnick, Impersonal Sociotechnical Capital, ICT’s, and 
Collective Action Among Strangers, in TRANSFORMING ENTERPRISE: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 399 (William H. Dutton et al. eds., 2005). 
 21. We are witnessing the rise of more collective forms of cultural creation as a result of the 
network technology that facilitates collaborative creation as well as the use and re-use of older cultural 
products to make new ones. See, e.g., Signal or Noise Conference, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sn/ 
(last visited July 6, 2005); Sasha Frere-Jones, 1+1+1=1: The New Math of Mashups, THE NEW 
YORKER, Jan. 10 2005, at 85.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/2
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This Article proposes to re-center the debate by arguing that the law 
recognize the rights of the community in online identity and craft 
appropriate rules to safeguard the group interest in online reputation. 
My goal is not to weaken the liberal, inward-driven conceptions of 
identity with which philosophy is concerned.22 Rather, my aim is to focus 
on the social ascriptions of identity that support group belonging and 
collective action online. The project is driven by the practical need to 
create a legal framework to solve a problem of collective action online. 
We need to address the issue of on-line reputation if we are to enable 
communities to create trust in cyberspace. This Article asks how we can 
create an incentive for the “moi commun,” as Rousseau termed it, the 
social conception of identity on which the law, as social regulator, must 
focus. In other words, this Article is not a re-telling of how technology 
changes our philosophy of identity. Rather, given the role that identity 
plays in fostering trust and social cohesion, what are the right legal rules 
for identity to create social order in online spaces? “If I have established a 
relevant reputation,” points out Russell Hardin, “it enables me to start new 
relationships with seemingly less risk to my new partner than he or she 
would face in a new relationship with someone with no or a bad 
reputation.”23 Identity is a means to the end of fostering the trust at the 
center of social interaction. In this case, cyberspace is fundamentally 
changing the underlying social behavior and allowing representation and 
reputation to be created in entirely new ways. The doctrine needs to 
account for how we actually build trust and create identity online and the 
normative vision for how we want to do so in the future. 
The vexing problem of online identity, I argue, has its solution, not in 
constitutional law, which regards identity as fixed rather than malleable; 
nor in the tort right of publicity, which defines identity with reference to 
visual manifestation; nor in the law of defamation, which concerns 
negative statements but not the positive construction of reputation24; nor in 
copyright law, which covers only the fixed expressions that represent our 
identity. Previous proposals relating to identity in the early years of 
cyberspace sought to apply these doctrines to the new environment.25 All 
of them have something to offer to the debate, but none are complete. 
 22. See generally C. FRED ALFORD, THE SELF IN SOCIAL THEORY: A PSYCHOANALYTIC 
ACCOUNT OF ITS CONSTRUCTION IN PLATO, HOBBES, LOCKE, RAWLS, AND ROUSSEAU (1991).  
 23. RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS 139 (2002). 
 24. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the 
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 692 (1986) (“Reputation . . . is a mysterious thing.”). 
 25. Robert Post indicates reputation is to be located either in the concepts of property, honor or 
dignity. Id. at 693. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Each protects an individual right in identity as an incentive to individuals 
to share information to facilitate trade. In a social software environment, 
however, identity is socially constructed. The community produces it by 
means of the available tools. We assume social roles within the various 
networks of which we are a part and those roles are subject to the 
reputation ascribed to them by the community. Identity is a form of 
collective action.26 The area of doctrine most closely analogous to how 
identity is constructed in cyberspace is, in fact, trademark, which also 
concerns the collective creation of brand identity. Not only does trademark 
concern the identity of fictional persons, like corporations, but trademarks 
are the product of a collective, namely the source of the mark and the 
buying public which associates the mark with that source. Trademark 
recognizes the interests of the collective in the authorship and use of 
identity in specific social contexts. We need to borrow27 from (not adopt) 
trademark law to account for the collective way reputation is created. It is 
a good place to locate a new doctrine of online reputation.28  
To elucidate this contention, Part I first tells Colin’s story in detail. The 
parties’ claims illustrate the commonly accepted legal approaches to 
online identity. In short, the common view is that rights in identity belong 
either to the real life person or to the company that provides the tools to 
make that identity manifest to others. Part I also explains how digital life 
is transforming identity and its construction. Part II shows the uses and 
deficiencies in three possible approaches to the problem: constitutional 
law approaches, including locating the rights of avatars in the fundamental 
rights tradition of the 14th and 5th Amendments; copyright law which 
protects characters; and tort law causes of action, like defamation and 
defamation of credit. Drawing on the deficiencies in these alternative 
 26. Hassan Masum & Yi–Cheng Zhang, Manifesto for the Reputation Society, 9 FIRST MONDAY 
(2004), http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue9_7/masum/ (“To promote an interconnected ecology 
of socially beneficial reputation systems, conscious design, analytical modeling, and learning from 
past successes and failures is indispensable.”).  
 27. For more on the conception of doctrinal borrowing, see Garrett Epps, Constitutional 
Borrowing, talk given at Law & Society 2005 conference in Las Vegas (June 4, 2005) (transcript on 
file with author) (Epps suggests that the Supreme Court borrows from one doctrinal area to apply to 
another. Because the rhetoric is familiar, we often fail to perceive the consequences of applying one 
legal concept in a wholly different arena.). 
 28. The challenge that technology poses to our legal understanding of identity is akin to the 
problems we are facing with regard to authorship and ownership of intellectual property. New 
technologies are enabling not only new, more collective models of creation, but also of distribution, 
marketing and consumption. See Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 951 (2004); see also Marilyn Strathern, Imagined Collectivities and Multiple 
Authorship, in CODE: COLLABORATIVE OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 
13. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/2
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approaches, Part III argues that trademark law, because it recognizes the 
rights of the collective in the mark, provides better guidance of how to 
think about online reputation. I propose that the public has interests in 
online reputation that go beyond that of either the tool-providing company 
or the creator and those interests will not be represented by market 
incentives alone. Part IV then reasons from trademark law to fashion a 
practical legal approach to online reputation, arguing that courts recognize 
the community right in reputation and suggesting some of the rules we 
might adopt to safeguard strong online identity. 
I. COLIN’S STORY 
E-Bay’s terms of service (Section 5.4) provide that “eBay’s Verified 
Rights Owner (VeRO) program works to ensure that listed items do not 
infringe upon the copyright, trademark or other rights of third parties. 
VeRO program participants and other rights owners can report listings 
offering infringing items, and request that such items be removed.”29 The 
VeRO program is eBay’s response to the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA). The DMCA provides that internet service providers, to be 
entitled to the exemption from liability for contributory copyright 
infringement provided for under the DMCA statute, must provide a 
contact name and number and must act to take down allegedly infringing 
copyrighted material.30 The DMCA compels on-line service providers who 
want to take advantage of this safe harbor from prosecution under the 
statute to institute administrative procedures to serve as private copyright 
policemen. 
Hence the VeRO program “lets intellectual property rights owners 
report listings that infringe their rights. It is in eBay’s interest to ensure 
that infringing items are removed from the site, as they erode buyer and 
good seller trust.”31 It also helps eBay avoid liability under the DMCA by 
offering clear, privately-administrable take-down procedures. 
Not wanting to undertake the costly measure of adjudicating copyright 
disputes before the courts, eBay will take down any auction accused of 
trafficking in infringing and violative material.32 At the same time, and 
 29. For an example of a VeRo action, see Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment, 410 F. Supp. 2d 
1010 (D. Colo. 2005) (17 U.S.C. 512(f) action for knowing misrepresentation against defendant who 
sought take down under VeRO program). 
 30. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(a)(iii) (2000) (“[U]pon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove or disable access to, the material. . . .”). 
 31. VeRO Program, http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/programs-vero-ov.html. 
 32. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 21 (2005) (“To say that collective 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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consistent with the DMCA, the VeRo program provides a limited right of 
redress for the seller of the allegedly infringing material. If a seller feels 
that her listing has been taken down in error, she can petition the 
intellectual property owner or ask eBay to do so on her behalf. There is no 
guaranteed right of “put back,” but eBay has detailed dispute resolution 
procedures in place to assist with such disputes. After all, SquareTrade, 
eBay’s dispute resolution provider, has adjudicated upwards of one 
million disputes for eBay,33 approximately half the number of cases 
currently pending in the entire U.S. Federal court system.34 
It is against the backdrop of this policy, which applies to artwork and 
music (not only avatars) that Colin’s auction was initially taken down. 
Sony Online Entertainment had notified eBay that Colin’s sale of his 
Everquest avatar constituted a violation of Sony’s terms of service. As a 
condition of receiving an account to play Everquest, Sony had required 
Colin to agree to the following: 
The Station [Sony’s defined term for any of its games or websites], 
including, without limitation, all SOE [Sony On-Line 
Entertainment] Communication Features, contains copyrighted 
material, trademarks and other proprietary information including, 
without limitation, text, software, photographs, video, graphics, 
music and sound, and the entire contents of The Station and each 
area contained therein are copyrighted as a collective work under 
the United States copyright laws. SOE owns a copyright in the 
selection, coordination, arrangement and enhancement of such 
content. You may not modify, publish, transmit, participate in the 
transfer or sale, create derivative works, or in any way exploit, any 
of the content contained on The Station (including, without 
limitation, content that The Station enables you to download) 
without the express written permission of SOE and the copyright 
owner. In the event of any permitted copying, redistribution or 
publication of copyrighted material, no changes in or deletion of 
author attribution, trademark, legend or copyright notice shall be 
identities—that is, the collective dimensions of our individual identities—are responses to something 
outside ourselves is to say that they are products of histories, and our engagement with them invokes 
capacities that are not under our control. Yet they are social, not just because they involve others, but 
because they are constituted in part by socially transmitted conceptions of how a person of that identity 
property behaves.”). 
 33. SquareTrade has handled over 1 million disputes in over 120 countries in 5 languages. About 
SquareTrade, http://www.squaretrade.com/cnt/jsp/abt/aboutus.jsp (last visited June 29, 2005).  
 34. For judicial caseload indicators, see http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/front/judbus03. 
pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2005).  
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made. The downloading of copyrighted material from The Station is 
allowed by you only for your own use. You acknowledge that SOE 
and/or third-party content providers remain the owners of all 
materials posted on The Station, and that you do not acquire any of 
those ownership rights by downloading copyrighted materials.35 
The company’s argument runs something like this. Under these terms, 
Sony believes it owns every expressive aspect of Everquest, including the 
avatars designed by players to represent themselves and serve as their 
online identity in that world. Regardless of time spent by players crafting, 
clothing, and imbuing those characters with lifelike characteristics and 
personalities, these assets belong to Sony Online Entertainment, according 
to the company. The characters are simply emanations of software code 
that generates a graphical image. The code is protected as a literary work 
and the image as a graphical or pictorial work under copyright law. The 
code is Sony’s property. The graphical representation, even if customized 
by the player, derives from intellectual property created by Sony. But it is 
not itself a derivative work. It is too intertwined with intellectual property 
developed by the Sony, including backdrops, graphics, and music. Players 
can only create characters using copyrighted software provided by the 
company. Furthermore, in a virtual world, much of the creation is 
collaborative.36 To permit anyone else to own intellectual property other 
than the game company would be to open a Pandora’s Box of disputes 
surrounding who owns what in this space where people routinely create 
together. But Sony did not have to argue its case to eBay. The VeRO 
program provided an automatic mechanism for Sony to police, and eBay 
to avoid problems with, third party intellectual property. 
While Sony was politely threatening eBay to take down Colin’s auction 
or risk liability, at the same time, the company launched Station Exchange, 
a new online marketplace of its own for the sale and trade in virtual goods. 
“Station Exchange is the official Sony Online Entertainment auction 
service that provides players a secure method of buying and selling the 
right to use in-game coin, items and characters in accordance with SOE’s 
license agreement, rules and guidelines.”37 Sony uses its terms of service 
 35. http://sonyonline.com/tos/tos.jsp. 
 36. Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Gilded Cage User Created Content and Building the 
Metaverse, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW AND VIRTUAL WORLDS (Jack Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck 
eds., forthcoming 2006) (arguing that the uniqueness of virtual world technology lies in its facilitation 
of collaborative creation rather than individual crafting). 
 37. Station Exchange: The Official Secure Marketplace for Everquest II Players, 
http://stationexchange.station.sony.com/ (last visited July 6, 2005). 
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agreement to force players to trade virtual goods in its own marketplace 
where it can control and profit from the flow of commerce. Precisely the 
behavior that Sony sought to forbid on eBay, it is promoting through its 
own service, Station Exchange. 
Despite the take down notices from eBay, Colin re-listed his auction. 
The plan was, as he had done before, to sell his avatar by charging a price 
for his username and password which would give the buyer control over 
the avatar and then enable the buyer to change the name and address on 
the account. As Colin commented,  
I had listed an account and inadvertently left out the disclaimer. 
This was later pointed out to me by eBay with a standard canned 
response that my auction had been ended because of VeRO claim 
by Sony. Ok, no prob I’ll just put the disclaimer back in and re-list 
the item. Again the item was canceled and I received the canned 
response about VeRO infraction. I listed the item a 3rd time but 
with the disclaimer at the head of the listing thinking that it was just 
to [sic] small at the bottom of the page but once again is was 
canceled. I gave up on eBay and sold the item through another 
online auction site (http://www.playerauctions.com).38 
Around the same time, Colin also sold a Level 30 Dark Elf Fury avatar 
who was also, according to Colin, “a Level 50 Tailor, one of the best 
known tailors on the server. I even had a website set up for the tailoring 
community (www.eq2tailor.com) and that I incidentally sold with the 
account.”39 
But three strikes and you’re out! 
One week later, Colin received notification that his eBay account was 
suspended indefinitely and, with it, eight years of reputation points. The 
act of selling his Everquest identity triggered the demise of his eBay 
identity. Colin was, needless to say, aggrieved. He feared that without 
those reputation points, his ability to sell other goods online would be 
adversely affected, an assumption borne out by social scientific study.40 
 38. E-mail from Colin Hepburn to author (Apr. 10, 2005, 11:36:32 EST) (on file with author). 
 39. E-mail from Colin Hepburn to author (June 19, 2005, 09:05:37 EST) (on file with author). 
 40. See Daniel Houser & John Wooders, Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from 
eBay 17 (University of Arizona, Working Paper No. 00-01, 2001), available at http://eller.arizona.edu/ 
~jwooders/revision.pdf, (“Our main finding was that seller reputation (but not bidder reputation) is a 
statistically and economically significant determinant of auction prices.”); see also Paul Resnick & 
Richard Zeckhauser, Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: Empirical Analysis of eBay’s 
Reputation System, in 11 ADVANCES IN APPLIED MICROECONOMICS, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNET 
AND E-COMMERCE (Michael R. Baye ed., 2002); Gary E. Bolton et al., How Effective Are Online Price 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/2
p1733 Noveck book pages.doc7/24/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ONLINE IDENTITY 1745 
 
 
 
 
 
 
He was upset enough to contact an unknown virtual worlds lawyer (yours 
truly) via the Internet to plead his case and request assistance with finding 
legal counsel. From Colin’s perspective, his reputation points and his 
avatar are his property. They belong to him because of the time and energy 
spent creating them.41 But in addition to this Lockean conviction that hard 
work results in private property, Colin also felt a dignitary right in his 
virtual identities. He was a member of these communities.42 Either way, he 
has rights in them that no one should be able to take away. Colin wanted 
redress. His indignation went beyond that of someone who lost money or a 
potential business opportunity. Colin had lost something deeply personal 
and special to him. It was not a thing of which he was deprived. Rather, 
losing his eBay account was like losing a piece of himself, a social calling 
card into the marketplace and community of eBay users. He used his 
reputation points to increase the value of his sales of all manner of goods. 
His reputation on eBay was a valuable asset he had been awarded by the 
community that had given him this feedback. 
Colin believed that his reputation points “belonged” to him as an 
extension of his identity and as property that he owned and earned, but he 
also felt entirely comfortable selling his Everquest avatar. He had 
inhabited the skin of that Kerra Bruiser and in Everquest, people knew 
Colin as that avatar. He had no other identity. The avatar was he and he it. 
Because he viewed himself as having an individual property right in his 
avatar—and the account that controlled it—he believed he had the right to 
alienate his own identity as an asset. 
Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation MANAGEMENT SCIENCE (forthcoming) (sellers are more 
likely to sell and to realize price premiums). 
 41. For more on the Lockean notion that spending time and money creating an avatar entitles you 
to property rights in it, see Cory Ondrejka, Changing Realities: User Creation, Communication, and 
Innovation in Digital Worlds (2005), http://www.themis-group.com/uploads/Changing%20Realities. 
pdf; Julian Dibbell’s Play Money Webpage, http://www.juliandibbell.com/playmoney/ (last visited 
June 28, 2005); Andres Eriksson & Kalle Grill, Who Owns My Avatar?-Rights in Virtual Property, 
http://www.infra.kth.se/~kg/Who%20owns%20my%20avatar.pdf (last visited June 28, 2005). 
 42. See Sal Humphreys, Commodifying Culture—It’s Not Just About the Virtual Sword (2004), 
http://www.itu.dk/op/papers/humphreys.pdf. (last visited July 18, 2005); Ren Reynolds, Hands Off MY 
Avatar! Issues With Claims of Virtual Property and Identity, in DIGITAL GAMES INDUSTRIES: WORK, 
KNOWLEDGE AND CONSUMPTION (J. Rutter ed., forthcoming 2006), available at http://www.ren-
reynolds.com/downloads/HandsOffMYavatar.htm; T.L. Taylor, “Whose Game Is This Anyway?”: 
Negotiating Corporate Ownership in a Virtual World, in PLAY BETWEEN WORLDS: EXPLORING 
ONLINE GAME CULTURE (forthcoming 2006). 
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A. The Meaning of Identity OnLine 
So what is new about Colin’s story that we should care about it? 
With changes in technology we construct reputation in new ways. 
Identity online functions differently than identity off-line but it also 
functions differently in the cyberspace we currently inhabit and will 
inhabit than it did ten or even five years ago. 
First, these new forms of on-line identity, on the one hand, share much 
in common with off-line identity. While we are used to thinking about 
identity in cyberspace the way we think about a bank statement or social 
security number, online identity is becoming more socially contextualized. 
Previously in the web world,43 our online identity may have comprised this 
“crabbed description”44 of ourselves as a collection of statistics or our 
statements in a chat room45—this has little to do with the highly nuanced 
and richly instantiated selves we experience in more social and interactive 
online environments. Like off-line identities, our new online selves are 
emergent, dynamic, and evolving through interaction with others. We have 
physical representation and can express ourselves with voice, gesture as 
well as text.  
Second, online identity also looks quite different from real space. It is 
more malleable and potentially much more controllable in mediated 
environments.46 In the physical world, our identity takes myriad forms, 
including those we consciously take on (name, profession), those we 
subconsciously or even involuntarily project (race, class), and those that 
others ascribe to us (personality, status). In cyberspace, we have more 
variations on identity.47 But, more significantly, we have qualitatively 
different ways of manipulating identity. We have the ability to erase or 
minimize the involuntary projection of identity and to create more and 
 43. See Noveck, supra note 10.  
 44. Susan P. Crawford, Who’s in Charge of Who I Am?: Identity and Law Online, 49 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 211, 214 (2004). 
 45. See Hal Abelson & Lawrence Lessig, Digital Identity in Cyberspace, White Paper Submitted 
for 6.805/Law of Cyberspace: Social Protocols (Dec 10, 1998), http://www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/6095/ 
student-papers/fall98-papers/identity/white-paper.html (“Identity is a unique piece of information 
associated with an entity. Identity itself is simply a collection of characteristics which are either 
inherent or are assigned by another. The color of a person’s hair and whether or not another thinks he 
is attractive is part of a person’s identity.”).  
 46. Cf. Stephanie Rosenbloom, Loosing Google’s Lock on the Past, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2005, at 
G1 (“Marissa Mayer, director of consumer Web products for Google, said that people call and e-mail 
the company regularly to request that links to their names be removed, though she would not estimate 
how many.”).  
 47. A new company, GamePal, allows you to “rent” an avatar in fourteen different virtual world 
games. GamePal Home Page, http://gamepal.com/rentals (last visited June 28, 2005). 
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different voluntary forms of identity.48 We can voluntarily embed 
ourselves in new social groups and contexts where we exercise greater free 
choice over identity.49 Whereas in real space my skin color and gender are 
(relatively) immutable traits, they are not in cyberspace.50 We not only 
have the ability to erase identity (as we do on the phone or in a letter, to an 
extent) but we also have the tools to shape and control the identity others 
ascribe to us.51  
Third, multiple personalities are the “feature not the bug.” One person 
can consciously co-exist with different identities because of the ease with 
which we can publish or conceal information about ourselves. We can 
embed ourselves in different groups and assume different roles in each 
one. This socio-technical fact often gives rise to concern about the lack of 
accountability, integrity and authenticity that results from the ease of 
interacting anonymously in cyberspace.52 The difficulty of ascertaining 
any physical “truth” about a person obscured by the screen reinforces the 
ability to construct multiple existences.53 Not only can I be a professor, 
 48. The distinctiveness of on-line identity is exemplified by the infamous story of Mr. Bungle, 
the character in the text-based virtual world LambdaMOO who “presented to the virtual world—he 
was at the time a fat, oleaginous, Bisquick-faced clown dressed in cum-stained harlequin garb and 
girdled with a mistletoe-and-hemlock belt whose buckle bore the quaint inscription ‘KISS ME 
UNDER THIS, BITCH!’”, Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace: How an Evil Clown, a Haitian 
Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database Into a Society, THE VILLAGE 
VOICE, Dec. 23, 1993, at 26, available at http://juliandibbell.com/texts/bungle_vv.html. 
 49. See Gaia Bernstein, Accomodating Technological Innovation: Identity, Genetic Testing and 
the Internet, 57 VAND. L. REV. 965, 984 (2004) (“[T]he incorporation of group values into one’s life-
story through participation in Internet groups applies pressure on the liberal aspects of that life-
narrative. The need to incorporate group values, in particular, affects aspects of the life narrative that 
are governed by the uniqueness and separateness tenets of the liberal meta-narrative.  
 At the same time . . . that adoption of a new community through the Internet can exert 
pressure on the communitarian meta-narrative. The communitarian identity meta-narrative 
does not endorse free choice in the selection of group values. . . . Hence, exercising a choice 
to belong to a new group in fact enhances the individual’s autonomy and self-fulfillment, 
thereby strengthening in this respect the liberal aspects of that individual’s life-narrative.  
 50. See Jerry Kang, Cyber-race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (2000); Nick Yee, Through the 
Looking Glass, The Daedalus Project (Feb. 21, 2004), http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/archives/ 
000755.php?page=1.  
 51. As Foucault noted with regard to Sartre’s thinking about identity: “The idea that the self is 
not given to us, I think there is only one practical consequence. We have to create ourselves as a work 
of art.” Appiah, supra note 32, at 18 (quoting MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ESSENTIAL WORKS: ETHICS—
SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH, at 262 (2005)). 
 52. See Jonathan D. Wallace, Nameless in Cyberspace: Anonymity on the Internet, 54 CATO 
INSTITUTE BRIEFING PAPERS (1999), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp54.pdf; M. E. 
Kabay, Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Cyberspace: Deindividualization, Incivility and Lawlessness 
Versus Freedom and Privacy, Paper presented at Annual Conference of the European Institute for 
Computer Anti-Virus Research (EICAR) (1998), available at http://www2.norwich.edu/mkabay/ 
overviews/anonpseudo.htm.  
 53. See Ken Jordan et al., The Augmented Social Network: Building Identity and Trust into the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1733 Noveck book pages.doc7/24/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1748 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1733 
 
 
 
 
 
 
daughter, friend, and music lover, as I would be off-line, but I can more 
cheaply and easily create entirely fictional identities (sans makeup and 
wigs) that persist over time. We have been able, for a long time, to create 
different representations of ourselves in different social contexts. In 
cyberspace, it becomes easier and cheaper while concomitantly making it 
more difficult to discern the physical persona that may attach to the online 
identity. Yet as we spend more time in cyberspace and do more in the 
virtual world, we must maintain a certain persistence to our identity in 
different contexts. 
Fourth, identity in cyberspace is divorced from identity in real space. 
Not only we can be a different person online than we are off-line, but 
online identity is alienable.54 It can be assumed by different offline 
entities. Multiple sellers in a family, for example, may share an eBay 
account and develop a reputation collectively. Unbeknownst to members 
of the online community, the role of “treasurer” in that group may be 
played by more than one real life person. As Susan Crawford writes: 
“Cyberspace users may be getting used to the idea of identity online that is 
different from identity offline—identity that is ‘unbundled’ and exists only 
in an online space may be a concept whose time has now come.”55  
Moreover, one online identity can represent the interests, wishes and 
actions of a group, a “group avatar.” The legal fiction of the corporation is 
an off-line example of the group avatar. Communities often “own” or 
control assets collectively, such as the native community in Mato Grosso, 
Brazil that Anthony Seeger describes as managing their native songs by a 
variety of group decision mechanisms.56 In the online environment, where 
we have much greater flexibility in the choice of representations of 
identity, a group can easily be embodied—incorporated if you will—in the 
avatar. In other words, online identity can mask one person, more than one 
person or different groupings of people who stand behind that role and its 
representation in cyberspace. 
Finally, and most important, not only is technology making it easier to 
create new representations of ourselves—on the Internet, no one knows 
you are a dog—it is also making the creation of collective forms of 
reputation possible. While in cyberspace, online identity can be separated 
Next Generation Internet, 8 FIRST MONDAY (2003), http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue8_8/jordan/.  
 54. A point that Larry Lessig makes clear in telling the story of Jake Baker, a mild-mannered, 
even nerdy college student in the off-line world who becomes an aggressive purveyor of snuff porn. 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 21–22 (2000).  
 55. Crawford, supra note 44, at 215. 
 56. Anthony Seeger, Who Got Left Out of the Property Grab Again: Oral Traditions, Indigenous 
Rights, and Valuable Old Knowledge, in CODE, supra note 14, at 75, 80. 
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from off,57 online identity can also be re-associated with reputation. 
Colin—seller in the eBay marketplace—has a unique identity in that 
context based on the feedback points ascribed to him by those with whom 
he has done business. That reputation offers useful information that will 
have a material impact on whether another person will interact with him in 
that context, independent of whether Colin is an axe-murderer or a law 
professor in real life. 
In the communities of which we are a part, we adopt roles with the aim 
of accomplishing work together. I am the CEO or treasurer or voter or 
member of a particular subcommittee or player or buyer and I am expected 
to assume that identity as defined and agreed to by the group. In 
cyberspace, this is especially important as we depend on these role 
structures to ensure collaboration.58 This is what Erving Goffman referred 
to as “masks,” or social ascriptions of identity that we “perform” in order 
to fulfill a role within a team.59 They are “life scripts.”60 Of course, I can 
have myriad identities that allow me to embed myself in more social 
groups. But within each one my reputation needs to be persistent and 
verifiable, not vis-á-vis any “real world” identity but with regard to my 
commitments in that social circle. Hence, despite the flexibility of identity, 
as we increasingly become habitués of cyberspace, these identities become 
more, not less, important to our ability to work together. Representation is 
“thin” and malleable, the simulacrum of self, but reputation breathes life 
into flat characters and imbues them with an identity independent of the 
physical world and capable of trust. 
In cyberspace, we create representations of the social roles we play in 
each context. Those social roles can be filled by one or more than one 
“real world” person. The group, using software, then ascribes a 
reputation61 to that role that travels with the online identity. Colin has one 
identity on eBay and another in Everquest. His reputation in that role is 
 57. See Abelson & Lessig, supra note 45. 
 58. The practice of divvying up work to accomplish something together is the hallmark of open 
source software development, which relies on Internet communications and procedural structures to 
coordinate the activities of disparate programmers. See generally STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF 
OPEN SOURCE (2004) (discussing the organizational principles of open source software development 
and coordinating piecemeal work into finished software product).  
 59. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 16 (1959) (“When an 
individual or performer plays the same part to the same audience on different occasions, a social 
relationship is likely to arise.”). 
 60. APPIAH, supra note 32, at 22. 
 61. See Resnick et al., supra note 20, at 46 (“A reputation system collects, distributes, and 
aggregates feedback about participants’ past behavior. Though few producers or consumers of the 
ratings know one another, these systems help people decide whom to trust, encourage trustworthy 
behavior, and deter participation by those who are unskilled or dishonest.”). 
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created, not by Colin alone, but by the groups of which he finds himself a 
part.62 To a far greater degree than in the offline world, the individual 
chooses these roles and the community creates the reputation associated 
with them using tools provided by a private party. The graphical interface 
makes it easier for the group to create reputation and to perceive 
reputation as it evolves and changes.63 The eBay community uses the 
feedback system to police its own membership; the Slashdot community 
avails itself of unique software to moderate its own postings; Amazon 
shoppers recommend books based on each other’s preferences; the group 
that I create online can develop and encode its own forms of expertise. 
It is important to make clear how the collective construction of 
reputation in social software actually works in practice. 
B. The Technology of Identity 
In order to develop more doctrinal coherence we need a clear 
understanding of how technology is changing the functions of identity.64 
“Our conception of identity is,” after all, “dependent on the technology 
that mediates between social interaction.”65 Technology defines the scope 
of social relationships and our online social interaction has different 
characteristics. In order to know the law’s role, not only in shielding real 
world identity from abuse66 or piercing the veil between online and off-
line identity, but in fostering the development of the robust online identity 
that is essential to successful commerce and society online, we need to 
understand the technology. 
While we are all familiar with identity-as-visual-representation in 
cyberspace, because of the newness of the technology we have less 
experience with how online reputation is collectively created. Since the 
advent of the commercial Internet, we have used screen names or handles 
or logons to represent ourselves. We have an AOL handle. We appear 
under a different name on Yahoo. We use an altogether different 
 62. See Tracy Spaight, Who Killed Miss Norway, SALON, Apr. 14, 2003, http://www.salon.com/ 
tech/feature/2003/04/14/who_killed_miss_norway/index_np.html.  
 63. See Beth S. Noveck & David R. Johnson, Society’s Software, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 469 
(2005). 
 64. See Bernstein, supra note 49. 
 65. RISHAB AIYER GHOSH, Mechanisms for Collaboration, in CODE, supra note 14, at 110. 
 66. For some of the legal literature on identity theft and abuse, see Daniel J. Solove, Identity 
Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2003); Anthony E. 
White, Comment, The Recognition of a Negligence Cause of Action for Victims of Identity Theft: 
Someone Stole My Identity, Now Who is Going to Pay for It?, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 847 (2005). 
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“identity” in an on-line chat room or community like the Well or MUD.67 
Until recently, identity has really referred to the convention of using 
alternative names for ourselves in cyberspace as a shield to hide our “true” 
selves in order to associate anonymously or be able to define ourselves 
anew in these online spaces. With the advent of graphical technologies, we 
have added visual and even three-dimensional representations of self to go 
with those names. Now in a videogame or virtual world or even on instant 
messenger I have an icon or two or three-dimensional avatar as my “face” 
in cyberspace. 
Now we are moving from representation to reputation68 as the key to 
identity in the new cyberspaces and this is one reason why identity is 
becoming so much more important and meaningful in the second-
generation web. Social reputation software69 goes beyond mere naming 
conventions. It allows us to create positive and robust characters in online 
environments. Social reputation software makes manifest descriptions of 
our behavior and actions over time in these environments. Through 
numerical ratings or a graphic or map or even through the functionality of 
my avatar, the software gives the community a picture of my identity. 
These metrics embedded in the software say more about who I am in this 
space than my name and representation do alone. Unlike in real space 
where, when you meet me, my reputation may precede me or you may not 
know me from Adam, social software makes it possible to have reputation 
permanently and unavoidably attached to a person or to a piece of 
information.70 It would be as if, instead of giving you a business card 
when we met, with one click you could visualize my resume, my 
transcripts, my credit rating, and what my friends and enemies think of 
me. Imagine if, instead of knowing only what I want to tell you about me, 
you could summon that information the community wants you to know. In 
the same way that we force sex offenders to brand their homes71 or repeat 
drunk drivers to use special license plates72 or give companies special 
 67. See Dibbell, supra note 48; LESSIG, supra note 54. 
 68. For non-legal sources on reputation in cyberspace and the development of trust and identity, 
see http://databases.si.umich.edu/reputations/bib/bib.html (last visited July 5, 2005). 
 69. Social software is beginning to be discussed in the legal and social science literature. See, 
e.g., Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1105 (2005); David R. Johnson, Susan P. Crawford & 
John G. Palfrey, Jr., The Accountable Internet: Peer Production of Internet Governance, 9 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 9 (2004); Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 28; Clay Shirky, Situated Software (Mar. 30, 2004), 
http://www.shirky.com/writings/situated_software.html.  
 70. See Outfoxed, http://www.getoutfoxed.com (last visited June 29, 2005). 
 71. See, e.g., Megan’s Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (2005). 
 72. See, e.g., Evan S. Ben, License Plates Could Reveal DUIs, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 23, 2006, at 
B8.  
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credit ratings,73 social software makes it possible to construct more 
persistent forms of identity in spaces where we lack face-to-face social 
cues and clues. But unlike the license plates, social software also makes it 
possible for the group or the community to decide on its own “rating” 
criteria and implement those by means of the code.74 
What does this mean in current practice? Social reputation software 
ensures an effective measure of identity in a given context. It automates 
the calculation of social feedback and makes that feedback—the 
preferences and judgments of people connected via a network—visible on 
the screen. There are numerous social software websites that focus on 
social or dating relationships and offer rating systems whereby people are 
“rated” based on who they know and who their friends are. In other words, 
the wildly popular Friendster and Orkut provide a graphical map of my 
friendships. Cyworld, another social networking service, boasts a quarter 
of the population of Korea as its user base.75 Linked In provides such a 
map for my business relationships. Epinions bills itself as a “web of trust” 
system.76 It allows me to create a network of trusted reviewers. Slashdot 
moderates its site based on similar principles. The community decides 
which contributors and content is best, and that information rises to the 
top. Virtual worlds, like Second Life, have a social reputation system 
based on interactions between players. Time spent with another player 
indicates friendship.77 Opinity is a repository for reputation information 
from other sites. New publishing models also rely heavily on social 
 73. For an explanation of the credit rating system, see Andrew Berman, “Once a Mortgage, 
Always a Mortgage”—The Use (And Misuse) of Mezzanine Loans and Preferred Equity Instruments 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 22–23, on file with author).  
 74. Examples of software systems using social reputation schemes include Kuro5hin, which uses 
mojo to allow users to moderate the site. Mojo is a time-weighted average of comment ratings, used to 
set the “initial” rating for each new comment, http://www.kuro5hin.org/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2005). 
See also Slashdot, a “News for Nerds” site which uses a moderation system for both articles and 
authors that allows for a largely self-governed news outlet that obviates most hierarchical editorial 
functions. Slashdot, http://slashdot.org (last visited Aug. 10, 2005). See generally AAANDS, 
http://aaands.com/, auction addict, http://www.auctionaddict.net/, buysellbid.com, http://buysellbid. 
com/, virtual feedback, http://virtualfeedback.com/, ExpertCentral.com, http://www.expertcentral.com/ 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2005).  
 75. For a relevant article on Cyworld, see Jonny Evans, Koreans Find Secret Cybersauce, 
WIRED, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,68361,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_7. 
 76. Epinions-FAQ: The Web of Trust, http://www.epinions.com/help/faq/?show=faq_wot (last 
visited June 29, 2005). 
 77. http://secondlife.com/features/communication.php (last visited July 7, 2005). A rating score 
can be given by one avatar to another in selected categories (appearance, behavior, building skills). 
Rating an avatar costs L$ (Second Life currency called Linden Dollars). The weekly stipend allocated 
to an avatar by the game gods is based upon one’s rating score.  
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reputation software to filter content.78 Outfoxed is a service that “uses your 
network of trusted friends and experts to help you find the good stuff and 
avoid the bad” by using social reputation as a criterion in web surfing.79 
There are already a wide variety of social reputation tools even though we 
are just at the beginning of their evolution80 and are sure to see the 
development of a wide new array of technological structures designed to 
measure social reputation.81 
 78. Several websites use rating schemes to filter and edit content collaboratively. See, e.g., 
Discordia, http://www.discordia.us/scoop/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2005) (based on a customized version 
of the Scoop weblog software that provides a multi-layered discussion interface, similar to the 
Slashdot and Indymedia websites). See also infoAnarchy, http://www.infoanarchy.org/ (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2005). This site is community-edited—users decide what gets posted. Once a user creates an 
account and logs on, s/he can see submitted but as-yet unposted articles and recommend them for 
posting or for dumping. The Tennessee Independent Media Center, http://tnimc.org/ (last visited Aug. 
10, 2005). Unlike many of the other IMCs, this Indymedia site encourages users to rate content, 
influencing how prominently an article is displayed. See also Corante Many2Many: A group weblog 
on social software, http://many.corante.com/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).  
 79. http://getoutfoxed.com/ (last visited June 29, 2005). Outfoxed describes its methodology as 
follows:  
The essential idea of Outfoxed is that people make decisions based primarily on a few people 
whom they trust. The average person has a set of experts whom they consult in designated 
areas: the computer expert, the car expert, the fashion expert, the financial expert. If the 
opinions of these experts can be collected, they are incredibly useful: it is this metadata (data 
about other data) that gives the most intelligent filtering and sorting on the internet.  
 For example, Outfoxed lets my Mom know that I think its okay for her to install the 
Flash plugin, but that she should not install anything from Claria. That’s pretty good, but it 
gets better. The real power comes from chaining trust: Outfoxed also lets my mom know that 
PC Pitstop, a company that I trust, has reported that Orbitz advertises via spyware. So if she 
ends up on an Orbitz page, or if Orbitz is returned in a search result, she will know to think 
twice about doing business there. 
http://getoutfoxed.com/about.  
 80. Galit Sarfaty points out that current systems “differ according to a number of factors: (i) 
anonymity of users; (ii) what is rated; (ii) type of rating; (iii) who is moderating; and (v) ordering of 
ratings and filtering.” Sarfarty, supra note 7. 
 81. See Masum & Zhang, supra note 26 (“Emerging information tools are making it possible for 
people to rate each other on a variety of traits, generating what is really a whole set of reputations for 
each person. (Information technology is also indirectly increasing the need for such reputations, as we 
have to sift through more and more possibilities.) You may mentally assign a friend a bad reputation 
for being on time or returning borrowed items promptly, while still thinking them reliable for helping 
out in case of real need. No person can be reduced to a single measure of “quality.” So people will 
have different reputations for different contexts. But even for the same context, people will often have 
different reputations as assessed by different judges. None of us is omniscient—we all bring our 
various weaknesses, tastes, bias, and lack of insight to bear when rating each other. And people and 
organizations often have hidden agendas, leading to consciously distorted opinions.  
 Reputations are rarely formed in isolation—we influence each others’ opinions. Studying the 
structure of social connectivity promises to reveal insights about how we interact, and thinking about 
simple quantities like the average number of sources consulted before an opinion is formed will help 
us to better filter these opinions.) (internal citation omitted). 
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In the emerging world of social software82 and highly immersive online 
spaces, identity is becoming enriched with more persistent forms of 
reputation. There have been on-line communities since the beginning of 
the Internet, but social software and other tools that facilitate the creation 
of collaborative reputation and the inculcation of structures for trust-
building and collective action are fundamentally changing the nature of 
those communities. The growth of on-line social environments 
fundamentally depends upon the development of robust and 
contextualized persona. The ability to create “real” online persona 
counteracts the trend toward less iterative, less strong social ties that we 
regularly see in cyberspace. The software offers an opportunity to create 
what Hardin terms “intermediaries in trust” that help us to create 
informational feedback and produce stronger ties at the social level.83 
Much more so than in offline space, online identity is explicitly 
socially constructed. Instead of looking to these old ways of safeguarding 
property84 in reputation, I will argue in Part III that we should look to 
borrow from trademark law for guidance in crafting a new standard that 
recognizes the role of the collective in creating social reputation.  
II. LEGAL APPROACHES TO ON-LINE IDENTITY 
Since online identity looks different from offline and is arguably more 
crucial for forming social relationships in cyberspace, where we lack other 
mechanisms for trust-formation, it is crucial to explore what doctrinal 
approaches might create the right incentive for communities to invest in 
the creation of reputation. Let us examine how we have approached 
identity legally until now in order to assess how well these areas of law 
apply.85 We want to identify whether these doctrines will protect the group 
interest, not merely the individual property right, in reputation and in what 
 82. See Corante Many2Many weblog, supra note 78; Clay Shirky, Social Software and the 
Politics of Groups (Mar. 9, 2003), http://shirky.com/writings/group_politics.html. 
 83. HARDIN, supra note 23, at 140. 
 84. Post, supra note 24, at 695 (“[D]efamation law safeguards ‘that repute which is slowly built 
up by integrity, honorable conduct, and right living. One’s good name is . . . as truly the product of 
one’s effort’s as any physical possession.’”) (quoting Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of 
the Law of Defamation, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1904)).  
 85. The right of publicity, too, is an identity-related legal protection but, like copyright, it 
concerns representation rather than reputation, and like defamation, it protects a property right in 
personhood. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); White v. 
Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, 
Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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ways they might ensure persistence, transparency, and integrity of 
reputation over time. 
Constitutional, copyright, and tort law are the three doctrinal 
approaches that might logically be thought86 to be adaptable from offline 
identity to protect online identity.87 For the most part, these current 
doctrinal approaches focus on remedying the wrong of misappropriation of 
individual property. While they each offer valuable remedies for the 
problems and challenges of managing physical identity, their individual 
and property-centric approach is not based on the technological reality of 
online reputation as it is currently coming to be constructed. As we shall 
discuss by looking at these three ideal-types88 of identity law, each one 
gives us some helpful guidance without being, by itself, the right solution 
for promoting collectively created reputation. 
A. Constitutional Law 
Constitutional law is centrally concerned with identity. While the 
Fourth Amendment loosely relates to identity by protecting personal 
privacy from the incursions of search and seizure89 and the First 
Amendment protects one from compelled speech and safeguards the right 
to personal expression which fosters the development of personal identity 
and reputation,90 the sanctity of personal honor, dignity, and reputation are 
central to the protections imparted by the Fourteenth and Fifth 
Amendments. The immutability of identity, namely race and gender, lies 
 86. See Adam White Scoville, Text Is Self: The Merger of Property and Identity, 1999 B.C. 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 060507. Scoville explores the right of privacy, right of publicity, trademark, 
unfair competition, and copyright as approaches to on-line identity; although trademark is only 
touched upon and then rejected as inapposite for all but the protection of visual characters. Scoville’s 
concern is with protecting the property in identity. 
 87. There are, of course, other areas of law, including the “law of names” and the naming of 
fictional persons, such as corporations and organizations. See CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE § 17910 (West 
1997); Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1989). For regulations dealing with the integrity of 
identifying documents and technologies such as passports, see 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (2000); 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 211a–214 (2000). For examples justifying grant or denial of petition to change adult name, see 8 
U.S.C. § 1447(e) (2000) (name change in U.S. citizenship naturalization); In re Anonymous, 587 
N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992) (name change in relation to physical sex change operation); Jane 
M. Draper, Annotation, Circumstances Justifying Grant or Denial of Petition to Change Adult’s Name, 
79 A.L.R.3d 562 (1977). 
 88. See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 20–21, 57 (Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich eds., 1968). In an effort to make the social sciences more empirical and objective, Weber 
sought to reduce the complexity and disorder of social phenomena and render them capable of analysis 
by focusing on “ideal types” or basic models of socio-economic life. 
 89. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 90. See Abelson & Lessig, supra note 45. 
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at the foundation of the constitutional protections against discrimination.91 
Precisely because we cannot alter certain aspects of our identity and 
because they are not voluntary, the law intercedes to prevent social 
subjugation and status differentiation on the basis of traits over which we 
exercise no control.  
As a result, we might consider constitutional protections as ideally 
suited to safeguarding the rights of avatars and online identity. Several 
scholars have made the argument that, despite the fact that cyberspace is 
not a public but a private realm, constitutional protections should be 
extended to the on-line life.92 Avatar, or on-line identity, one might argue, 
could benefit from the application of constitutional principles. Such 
safeguards would permit the flourishing of on-line identity. Imagine if on-
line persona enjoyed free speech rights? Raph Koster has floated just such 
a proposal,93 suggesting that inhabitants of immersive, virtual spaces 
should be entitled to the protection of their expression against, not only the 
government, but also the de facto government of these spaces, namely the 
“game gods,” or private owners of the servers that control virtual worlds 
and massively multiplayer videogames.94 If our on-line persona enjoyed 
the liberties of free speech and the right to be free from compelled speech, 
this would help to develop more robust, endowed, and autonomous on-line 
identities. We would have to balance the free speech rights of avatars 
against the dangers of online libel and defamation, but, it could be argued, 
we overcame this challenge in real space.95 Furthermore, we might 
 91. For writings about social subjugation and race, see Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above 
All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986); see also Paul Brest, Foreword: 
In Defense of the AntiDiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Jack Balkin, The 
Constitution of Status 106 YALE L.J. 2313 (1997).  
 92. See Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of 
Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1302–06 (2000) 
(arguing for application of constitutional norms in regulation of cyberspace); Peter S. Jenkins, The 
Virtual World as Company Town: Freedom of Speech in Massively Multiple OnLine Role Playing 
Games, 8 J. OF INTERNET L. 1, 17 (2004) (arguing that virtual worlds should be treated like company 
towns where such virtual worlds are open membership).  
 93. See Koster, supra note 1. 
 94. See Richard Bartle, Virtual Wordliness, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW AND VIRTUAL 
WORLDS, supra note 10 (“Early virtual worlds didn’t have the problem of people claiming real-life 
ownership of virtual objects. The reason for this was because these worlds would periodically reset—
everything was returned to its starting position, leaving only the character records of the players 
untouched. This was for design reasons, but one consequence was that players took it for granted that 
everything in the virtual world was transitory: the lord giveth and the lord taketh away.”) 
 95. See generally Robert B. Charles & Jacob H. Zamansky, Liability for Online Libel After 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 28 CONN. L. REV. 1173 (1996); Danielle M. Conway-
Jones, Defamation in the Digital Age: Liability in Chat Rooms, on Electronic Bulletin Boards, and in 
the Blogosphere, A.L.I.-A.B.A. BUS. L. COURSE MATERIALS J., Oct. 2005, at 63; Orit Goldring and 
Antonia L. Hamblin, Think Before You Click: Online Anonymity Does Not Make Defamation Legal, 20 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/2
p1733 Noveck book pages.doc7/24/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ONLINE IDENTITY 1757 
 
 
 
 
 
 
consider constitutionalizing equal protection or substantive due process 
rights of avatars. It is conceivable to explore what it would mean to 
require that one’s online identity be entitled to equal treatment as one’s 
off-line identity. We have such a rule now with regard to electronic 
signatures, for example, which by statute (unrelated to any constitutional 
justification) must be accorded the same legal value as paper signatures.96 
But what if we raised this protection to constitutional status? What if we 
accorded constitutional rights to avatars? Or created a doctrine of equal 
protection between avatars? 
Constitutionalizing rights of on-line identity is conceivable, but 
fundamentally the Constitution is the wrong tool to solve this narrower 
problem of reputation. The constitutional protections of free speech and 
association and safeguards against social status subjugation do not 
squarely address reputation. While the anti-discrimination principle 
recognizes the role others play in ascribing identities to us, it has no reason 
to provide for rights to the group, rather than the individual. Constitutional 
law protects against discrimination on the basis of involuntarily, but not 
voluntarily, created reputation.97 Equal protection is intended to protect us 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 383 (2003); John L. Hines, Michael H. Cramer & Peter T. Berk, 
Anonymity, Immunity, & Online Defamation: Managing Corporate Exposures to Reputation Injury, 4 
SEDONA CONF. J. 97 (2003); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in 
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000); Robert M. O’Neil, The Drudge Case: A Look At Issues In 
Cyberspace Defamation, 73 WASH. L. REV. 623 (1998); David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the 
Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the 
Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147 (1997); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace from the 
Listener’s Perspective: Private Speech Restrictions, Libel, State Action, Harassment, and Sex, 1996 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 377 (1996); Stephanie Blumstein, Note, The New Immunity In Cyberspace: The 
Expanded Reach Of The Communications Decency Act To The Libelous “Re-Poster”, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 407 (2003); Scot Wilson, Comment, Corporate Criticism on the Internet: The Fine Line 
Between Anonymous Speech and Cybersmear, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 533 (2002).  
 96. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign), 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 7001–7006, 7021, 7031 (2000); UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT (UCITA) (2002) 
(adopted in two states), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm; UNIF. 
ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (UETA) (1999) (adopted in forty-eight states), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm. See generally Daniel J. Greenwood & 
Ray A. Campbell, Electronic Commerce Legislation: From Written on Paper and Signed in Ink to 
Electronic Records and Online Authentification, 53 BUS. LAW. 307 (1997); Raymond T. Nimmer, 
Electronic Contracting: Legal Issues, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 211 (1996). 
 97. Of course, constitutional law can give way to tort law so that defamation can be enforced 
despite the First Amendment. “The common law of slander and libel is designed to effectuate society’s 
‘pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.’” Post, supra note 
24, at 691 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)). “The trick is then to ‘balance the 
State’s interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation against the First 
Amendment interest in protecting this type of expression.’” Post, supra note 24, at 691–92 (quoting 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2944–45 (1985) (opinion of 
Powell, J.)).”  
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from irrational and unreasonable differences in treatment on the basis of 
immutable traits.98 It does not speak at all to voluntarily assumed 
differences. The due process jurisprudence is no less inapposite. It is not at 
all clear how or why to apply the concept of fundamental rights to 
ephemeral, mutable, and non-physical forms of identity. To the extent that 
we would seek to protect equal treatment of on- and off-line persona by 
according rights and liberties to our avatars, the mutability of identity is a 
stumbling block. One can imagine the notion that there is a fundamental 
right to create online identity and to enjoy anonymity of that persona 
against compelled speech. The creation of an avatar could be regarded as a 
fundamental right of self-expression.99 But that protection—while both 
desirable and arguably already included in the penumbra of First 
Amendment rights as a form of free expression—may still not provide 
adequate protection to safeguard the community. Also, on-line reputation, 
the cornerstone of identity in the on-line space, is not by itself the 
complete measure of the person. A single eBay score, while indicative of 
who that person is in one community, does not say anything about identity 
in another community. Such totalizing protections as those the 
Constitution provides seem a bit broad in this context. 
These are protections from governmental incursions on liberty, but the 
challenge in most instances is not the government, it is private companies 
who assert a property right in personal reputation. Colin’s conflict arose 
out of his desire to claim ownership over his avatar (representation) and 
his eBay points (reputation) as against Sony and eBay. There are those 
who would suggest that these private on-line spaces, such as eBay or 
newly emerging virtual world environments, be treated as spaces of public 
 98. Immutable traits give rise to discrimination and often signal political powerlessness. See, e.g., 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985) (“The political 
powerlessness of a group and the immutability of its defining trait are relevant insofar as they point to 
a social and cultural isolation that gives the majority little reason to respect or be concerned with that 
group’s interests and needs.”); Hernandez v. Tex., 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The 
Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994). Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150 (1980) (“Surely 
one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or she can’t do anything about, but I’m not 
aware of any reason to suppose that elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling. 
Moreover, classifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically accepted as 
legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that immutability is relevant. The 
explanation, when one is given, is that those characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying 
to render suspect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there’s not much left of the 
immutability theory, is there?”) (internal citation omitted). 
 99. For a further discussion of avatar rights, see Dan Hunter, Avatar Rights, Terra Nova (Oct. 12, 
2003), http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2003/10/avatar_rights.html.  
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accommodation100 or as the new public forums101 where avatars would be 
able to assert constitutional protections102 against the owners of those 
spaces, the so-called “game gods.”103 But the Constitution does not give us 
the instruments with which to differentiate between spaces. Is eBay a 
public forum? Is Everquest? What protections do inhabitants of these 
spaces receive? Not all online spaces are the same, and the constitutional 
jurisprudence has not evolved to distinguish among them, nor does it 
provide the analytical tools to do so in the future.104 It is a hammer, 
designed for immutable, not mutable traits, when what we need is a much 
more refined instrument that takes account of the way identity is formed 
online. Constitutional law is designed to protect us from the government—
a negative liberty—rather than to accord us positive rights in the identities 
that we create or to create the social incentives to developing on-line 
identity. 
If what we are seeking is a legal incentive for the social creation of 
reputation, constitutional protections, while perhaps useful to protect the 
individual against the state or the private “god” of that cyberspace, are not 
a good match. There is no suspect class at issue nor is there any public 
space on which to peg such protections. However, while constitutional 
rights might not apply, constitutional values suggest that reputation is 
about more than just property. It is rooted in conceptions of dignity and 
honor. Hence, while constitutional law might not be adapted successfully 
in this context, we can take away a lesson from constitutional values for 
our doctrine of online reputation: a heightened regard for the value of 
personal identity and reputation that goes beyond mere property. 
B. Copyright Law 
If constitutional law has its shortcomings, we might instead turn to 
copyright law to protect on-line identity. Copyright law (along with 
 100. Noah D. Zatz, Note, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the 
Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH 149 (1998).  
 101. See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. 
L. REV. 439, 488–94 (2003) (discussing application of public forum doctrine to cyberspace); Beth 
Simone Noveck, Designing Deliberative Democracy In Cyberspace: The Role Of The Cyber-Lawyer, 
9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1 (2003); Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1153 n.167 (2005) (noting the holding of Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. 
of Tr. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998), holding “that the 
government’s provision of Internet access in a public library constitutes a designated public forum”). 
 102. See Koster, supra note 1. 
 103. See Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63 (2004); 
Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV 185 (2004). 
 104. See generally Balkin, supra note 103. 
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trademark and trade dress) is centrally concerned with the protection of 
fictional “characters” in copyrighted works independent of those works. If 
we protect literary or comic book characters with copyright, we might 
think about protecting on-line identity in the same way. One commentator 
has noted, “[f]ully realized characters in literature are little different than 
fully defined personalities in daily life. . . . A literary character can be said 
to have a distinctive personality, and thus to be protectable, when it has 
been delineated to the point at which its behavior is relatively predictable 
so that when placed in a new plot situation, it will react in ways that are at 
once distinctive and unsurprising.”105 Yet we can imagine that where a 
videogame, for example, provides the tools to create a richly instantiated 
and unique representation of self, copyright law may be brought to bear. If 
we assume that software can help to create more persistent forms of 
identity, should copyright law apply and does this help create the 
necessary incentives to developing identity online? 
It is well-settled copyright doctrine that specifically delineated and 
well-articulated fictional characters are entitled to copyright protections.106 
They need not be graphically represented. A fictional character, if 
sufficiently well expressed, is protected by copyright. As Learned Hand 
famously wrote, “It follows that the less developed the characters, the less 
they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for making 
them too indistinct.”107 There are two rationales for protecting character: 
either a character is sufficiently delineated, as Hand suggested, to be the 
fruit of creative expression rather than a stock character;108 or the character 
“constitutes the story being told” rather than being subordinated to the 
story, such as a Superman or a James Bond.109 
The copyrightability of character is the centerpiece of recent and 
ongoing secondary copyright liability litigation by a comic book company 
against a videogame producer. The former alleges that the tools provided 
by the videogame enable players of that game to infringe the rights of the 
comic book company in its valuable character-properties.110 The comic 
 105. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.7.2, 128 (1989). 
 106. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930); see also MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12 (1985–2005) (chapter on characters). 
 107. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. 
 108. See Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos. 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding “Superman” 
to be a protectable character). 
 109. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th 
Cir. 1954) (the “Sam Spade” case) (“It is conceivable that the character really constitutes the story 
being told, but if the character is only the chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the 
area of the protection afforded by the copyright.”).  
 110. See Marvel Enter., Inc. v. NCSoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253-RGK (PLAx), 2005 U.S. Dist. 
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book company argues that its characters are being infringed. The 
videogame company regards these characters as “stock” characters that 
belong to the general culture and the public domain rather than the 
sufficiently expressive identities belonging to any one creator. Moreover, 
and relevant to our exploration of identity, the videogame company is not 
itself copying the characters, it is providing the tools to its users to create 
their own characters, which may turn out to strongly resemble those of the 
comic book company. The Marvel Comics case, however it is resolved, is 
likely to push the boundaries of our understanding of what constitutes 
fictional “identity” and highlight the role software plays in creating it.  
The copyrightability of character is what gives rise to the dispute 
between Sony and Colin over ownership of Colin’s avatar. Because, in 
Sony’s view, it is intellectual property, ownership of that property must be 
resolved. Sony asserts that the character belongs to Sony because it 
provides the tools and the raw materials to construct the character. If there 
is any doubt, Sony asserts that, by contract at the very least, Colin has 
ceded any rights in his avatar to Sony. This may make sense so long as we 
think about on-line identity as something fictional, such as in the context 
of a game. While there is precedent for applying copyright protections to 
character even without visual representation, such as literary characters, 
there is no precedent for applying such treatment to non-fictional 
characters. The hallmark of copyright is expression that demonstrates a 
modicum of originality. To the extent that on-line identity is not to be 
considered a fictional character but, rather, a “real” projection of oneself, 
copyrightability may be irrelevant. 
Even if we read the doctrine as applying or adaptable to the protection 
of non-fictional online representations of self, it is not clear that we 
should. In our non-moral rights tradition, to treat identity as copyright 
makes it subject to all the usual vagaries of contract law and enables a 
company to demand assignment of identity as a condition of service. 
Furthermore, it would protect against the reproduction of identity and 
afford the owner the various rights of copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106, but not safeguard the integrity or persistence of reputation. 
Copyright protects the visual representation of identity, such as a 
painting or cartoon or sculptural rendering of my likeness.111 It also 
LEXIS 8448 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2005); see also Allen Rausch, NCsoft Scores Partial Victory Over 
Marvel, GAMESPY PC, Mar. 11, 2005, http://pc.gamespy.com/pc/city-of-heroes/595372p1.html. 
 111. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2000) (stating that among the subject matter copyright protects are 
“pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”). 
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conveys ownership in the software code112 that creates visual 
representations of the self on the screen, in addition to ownership of the 
graphical representations of the avatar as an image.113 In other words, if I 
write a computer program to generate pictures,114 I have separate 
copyrights both in the code to the program and in the graphical works 
created by the program. Copyright provides myriad avenues to protect 
representation. But while copyright may protect representation, it does 
little to protect reputation, which may not have a visual representation and 
is not necessarily fixed in a tangible medium of expression.115 
It is unclear how copyright might prevent the abuse of reputation 
created by the group. Copyright does provide for joint ownership. It allows 
for multiple authors. In moral rights jurisdictions, the cultural 
community—or the so-called public heritage—may retain an inalienable 
interest in work created by an artist.116 But those rights are narrowly 
circumscribed. If what we care about is creating incentives for the 
persistence of reputation to enable social interaction, protecting the 
originality and creativity of representation may not be enough to safeguard 
reputation.117 The protections copyright offers may, on the one hand, be 
too limited to create a framework for the promotion of on-line identity.118 
On the other hand, the protections it provides may also be too far 
reaching—even while copyright might be more adaptable than 
 112. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 117 (2000) (copyright’s protections for literary work also cover 
software code); see also Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986); 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer, Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); Williams Elec., Inc. 
v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); see also NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (CONTU), FINAL REPORT (1978). Cf. Pamela Samuelson, CONTU 
Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection For Computer Programs In Machine-Readable 
Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 (1984) (criticizing the CONTV Final Report and further arguing that 
copyright law is inappropriate for protection of computer programs). 
 113. See Reynolds, supra note 42 (addressing the copyrightability of an avatar from a non-
lawyer’s perspective).  
 114. See Kurzweil CyberArt Technologies, Inc., http://www.kurzweilcyberart.com (last visited 
July 8, 2005). 
 115. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. . . .”). 
 116. See John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339 
(1989); Nicole B. Wilkes, Public Responsibilities of Private Owners of Cultural 
Property: Toward a National Art Preservation Statute, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177 (2001); 
John Moustakas, Note, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 1179 (1989); Sarah La Voi, Comment, Cultural Heritage Tug of War: Balancing 
Preservation Interests and Commercial Rights, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 875 (2003). 
 117. Cf. Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (Scalia, J.) (noting 
that trademark, unlike other areas of intellectual property law, is not designed to protect originality and 
creativity). 
 118. See Molly Stephens, Note, Sales of In-Game Assets: An Illustration of the Continuing Failure 
of Intellectual Property Law to Protect Digital-Content Creators, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1513 (2002). 
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constitutional law for an on-line environment, what it fundamentally 
provides for is ownership. It creates, not a right of personhood,119 but a 
right of property in identity. This may make some sense when the goal is 
to protect the fictional and artistic creations of authors. 
Because copyright recognizes the expressive value of character, it gives 
us some guidance for on-line identity. It suggests that we take the 
construction of social roles in online spaces seriously and as something 
with its own, inherent creative value apart from off-line identity. 
Copyright also provides for rights in compilations, the creative 
arrangement, selection, or ordering of collective works.120 Reputation 
could be understood to be a creative arrangement of facts about a person. 
We can take away from copyright the notion that we ought to recognize 
the value inherent in the collective creation of the characters we “play” in 
our communities. Yet even though personhood, artistic integrity and 
authorial dignity may comprise part of the theoretical basis for intellectual 
property protection,121 the means to those ends under U.S. law is the 
creation of a property right in intangible creations. As we shall discuss 
when we address tort law approaches, this propertization of identity cannot 
be the basis for rights in collectively created reputation. 
C. Tort Law: Defamation 
The law of online reputation, perhaps most obviously, could be located 
in the doctrine of defamation and those torts that directly and expressly 
concern the preservation of personal identity against harm. Defamation 
law provides a way of preserving the integrity of reputation and may 
suggest a way forward with our problem. These communications torts 
have evolved from their earliest origins in Biblical times, when it was 
forbidden to “give false report.” Throughout the Middle Ages the Anglo-
Saxon Lex Talionis provided for removal of the tongue as a punishment 
for slander.122 Initially, the law of defamation protected people in high 
 119. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). Radin 
expands upon the Hegelian notion that ownership of property is inextricably bound up with our 
conception of self. She views the property right as itself a right of personhood. Id. 
 120. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000). 
 121. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 
1203, 1212–15 (1998) (“Political theorists and legal scholars have developed four main ways of 
shaping and justifying property rights in general, and intellectual property rights in particular.”); F. 
Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL L. REV. 1, 43 (2004) 
(“There are as many normative accounts of property as there are property theorists. . . .”). 
 122. PETER F. CARTER-RUCK & RICHARD WALKER, CARTER-RUCK ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 18 
(3d ed. 1985). 
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positions and guarded against calumny of the state and those in power, 
rather than providing for a private right of action or a right in personal 
identity. It was only with the attempt to outlaw dueling by the Star 
Chamber in sixteenth century England that civil actions for defamation of 
ordinary persons became an increasingly popular alternative to shore up 
the culture of honor,123 so much so that the courts were overwhelmed by 
“action upon the case for words.”124 
While the history of the law of defamation125 is marked first by this 
radical shift from protection of public to private figures and to private 
rights in identity, it is also marked by a second transformation from a 
protection of the rights of personal dignity and honor to a protection of a 
property right in reputation coterminous with the rise of mercantilism. In 
other words, while the early common law protected reputation because 
“men’s reputations are tender things, and ought to be like Christ’s coat, 
without seam,”126 the need to do business with a wider circle of often 
unknown acquaintances gave added significance to reputation. Reputation 
became, not simply an aspect of honor or dignity, but important as 
property, because without it, one could not make a living in a world of 
faceless interchange. Losing one’s reputation resulted in a pecuniary loss. 
The law evolved the doctrine necessary to protect this property right in 
reputation by means of a legal fiction.127 Reputation became a currency, 
trade in which enabled commerce. This property conception of identity 
squarely undergirds our modern conception of the tort of defamation.128 
The narrative of a commercial society dependent upon preservation of 
identity in the service of commerce has carried over from real space into 
cyberspace. There is a sizeable emerging literature on communications 
torts such as libel, slander, and defamation in cyberspace.129 It focuses 
primarily on the making of negative statements by anonymous and 
 123. Id. at 20. 
 124. Id. at 20–21. 
 125. See generally id. at 16–29; JOHN TOWNSHEND, TREATISE ON THE WRONGS CALLED 
SLANDER AND LIBEL 37–49 (4th ed. 1890); Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American 
Society, 74 CAL. L. REV. 743 (1986); Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of 
Criminal Libel in American Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 433 (2004). 
 126. TOWNSHEND, supra note 125, at 47 (quoting Lord Bacon, Leg. Gul. Conq. 14 in the 
ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES, published by the English Record commissioners). 
 127. Id. at 47 (“[W]here the law does protect reputation, it does so indirectly, by means of a 
fiction—an assumption of pecuniary loss.”).  
 128. Post, supra note 24, at 696 (“No person has the right to a reputation other than that created by 
the evaluative processes of the market, and, conversely, every person enjoys an equal right to enter the 
market to attempt to achieve what reputation he can.”).  
 129. See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in 
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000). 
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unidentifiable actors to the detriment of a business interest. The “problem” 
is that if identity is property, the ease with which we can engage in 
anonymous speech online is a threat to that property. Identity is not a 
positive ascription, but a challenge to be overcome.130 The individual 
property rights conception directs our attention to the boundary between 
the real life person and the online identity. The new, robust, highly-
contextualized and richly-instantiated forms of online identity—from the 
graphical, three-dimensional renderings of lifelike avatars to the 
community-creation of social reputation by means of social software—
receive the same treatment as an item of information. They are treated like 
property, rather than personhood, and restrictive ownership is asserted 
over them. We most commonly talk about identity in terms of “identity 
theft,” propagating a notion that identity can be stolen like a piece of 
tangible property.  
Even worse, on-line identity, as the general rule, is treated under 
American law as other people’s property, not even our own. As Susan 
Crawford writes: 
[J]ust as we are getting comfortable with the idea of these 
contextual, group-shaped, customized online avatar identities, it is 
disturbing to learn that online intermediaries (the companies who 
create online spaces—currently, games, but in the future, walled 
worlds that will be our internets) now have ‘ownership’ of online 
identities, together with hooks allowing them to remove identities 
they don’t like. In other words, the “gods” of the virtual worlds are 
making all the rules (or laws) about identity.131 
On-line identity is property to be owned, generally by the company that 
provides the facilities for social interaction. Companies, eager to avoid any 
potential liability and increasingly concerned about the imposition of 
indirect and secondary forms of liability, no longer content themselves 
with ignoring on-line activity. Rather, they assert their complete 
ownership, control, and rights of take down. There is no legislation to 
provide to the contrary, nor is there any judge-made law as yet that would 
hold otherwise.  
The central problem with treating identity as information and as 
property in the metaverse is that the identity-as-property theory assumes 
 130. See Scoville, supra note 86. 
 131. See Crawford, supra note 44, at 212 (internal citation omitted). 
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that the law needs to step in to protect an individual right to reputation in 
order to safeguard commerce in the marketplace.  
Nowhere is the disjuncture between the identity-as-property vision and 
what is actually taking place in cyberspace more apparent than when we 
try to apply defamation rules to on-line reputation. This is not to suggest 
that defamation law is not relevant or applicable in cyberspace. It is still 
well-suited to protecting real world people from harmful and injurious 
statements made in cyberspace or offline. The rules are not less applicable 
because of the medium. But as a cause of action to protect the social 
interests in on-line reputation, defamation works less well, not least of all 
because the need here is to maintain transparency and consistency of 
reputation, not only to protect against injurious words. 
“Defamation of credit,” the specific type of defamation that applies 
when one’s financial reputation is impugned, might otherwise appear to be 
the most applicable legal protection of online identity. Financial reputation 
is, of course, explicitly created by third parties. Commercial vendors and 
community creditors collaborate to create the credit rating. Everyone who 
has lent me money disclosed my reliability as a borrower in order to assure 
that future decisions by members of the lending community comport with 
my trustworthiness. The Fair Credit Reporting Act132 and the Federal 
Consumer Credit Protection Act133 both create a cause of action for 
misreporting of credit status by credit agencies,134 as defined in the 
statutes.135 Like the deletion of Colin’s online reputation, if Equifax 
deletes or misstates my consumer credit reputation, it can be held liable.136 
 132. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a) (2000 & Supp. 2003) (“Any person who is negligent in failing to 
comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to 
that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of . . . actual damages; . . . and reasonable attorney’s 
fees. . . .”); see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2000 & Supp. 2003); see also Stephen R. Pitcher, 
Commercial Defamation Caused by Erroneous Credit Report Issued by Credit Reporting Agency, 9 
AM. JUR. 2D, Proof of Facts § 1 (2005).  
 133. 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (2000) (“Whoever willfully and knowingly (1) gives false or inaccurate 
information or fails to provide information which he is required to disclose under the provisions of this 
subchapter or any regulation issued thereunder . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned 
not more than one year, or both.”). 
 134. The major credit agencies are Equifax, Transunion, and Experian, while the major company 
and debt rating agencies are Moody’s Investor Services, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch. See Michael 
Pereira, Risk Management for the Age of Information, FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 715 n.175 (2004) 
(reviewing ROBERT J. SCHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2003)).  
 135. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2000) (“The term ‘consumer reporting agency’ means any person 
which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in 
part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on 
consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means 
or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.”). 
 136. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (holding 
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The cause of action also can be found in state common law137 as well as in 
these federal statutes. Defamation of credit “originally stemmed from the 
merchant’s right to protection of an erroneous sullying of his credit 
reputation.”138 It has its origins in so-called “trade libel” that arose out of 
need for accurate credit information about unknown merchants. Whereas 
in earlier times, reputation was ascertained either through social ties and 
affiliations or visual inspection of the goods, once those face-to-face 
mechanisms broke down, the law of trade libel emerged to protect a 
merchant’s reputation in the marketplace and facilitate trade.139 We have 
further adapted this common law idea into statutory protections suited to a 
complex, highly information-driven, and often automated financial 
markets where one’s credit score is one’s calling card. A falsely-poor 
credit rating can effectively exclude one from the market economy. Hence, 
statutes also exist imposing criminal and civil penalties140 for making 
various kinds of false statements for the purpose of obtaining credit 
information. 
Defamation of credit and trade libel would seem to be closely akin to 
the loss of reputation rating on eBay (or the deletion of one’s AOL screen 
name or Amazon seller’s points). It is equivalent to the loss of a 
financially valuable calling card facilitating commerce. If TRW deletes 
my credit rating or Standard and Poor’s deletes the rating for my company, 
I am hampered from doing business in the marketplace. Like a credit 
report, an eBay rating makes it possible to do business in that marketplace 
by providing potential buyers and sellers with additional information. So 
why not just apply this doctrine to online identity? Why not, as a matter of 
public policy, protect online identity the way we protect credit reporting 
that action for defamation for the false statements in credit report did not require showing of actual 
malice for recovery of presumed and punitive damage). 
 137. See Myshrall v. Key Bank Nat. Ass’n, 802 A.2d 419 (Me. 2002) (holding that Maine’s Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1311 (West 2004), did not preempt common law 
cause of action for defamation of credit); see also Stafford v. Cross Country Bank, 262 F. Supp. 2d 
776 (W.D. Ky. 2003). 
 138. Fairfax Leary, Jr. & Richard Seth Hudson, Unfair Credit Reporting and Wrongful 
Dishonor—Two Wrongs Made from the Same Right, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1985) (arguing that 
short shrift given to wrongful dishonor of credit information by the Uniform Commercial Code is 
resulting in a weakening of the tort, and calling for adoption of reasonableness standard). 
 139. See Marzetti v. Williams, (1830) 109 Eng. Rep. 842 (K.B.) (contract damages for wrongful 
dishonour of a cheque). 
 140. 15 U.S.C. § 1681q (2000) (“Any person who knowingly and willfully obtains information on 
a consumer from a consumer reporting agency under false pretenses shall be fined under title 18, 
imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(b) (2000 & Supp. 2003) (“Any 
person who obtains a consumer report from a consumer reporting agency under false pretenses or 
knowingly without a permissible purpose shall be liable to the consumer reporting agency for actual 
damages sustained by the consumer reporting agency or $1,000, whichever is greater.”). 
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given its central role in the information economy, especially for enormous 
marketplaces like eBay that allow ordinary people with no start up capital 
to create niche markets for the sale of goods? 
Quite simply, the answer is we should. But eBay is not Equifax, and 
therefore defamation of credit, by itself, is inapposite. First, reputation is 
created through peer production, not hierarchy. While eBay, like a credit 
rating agency, is also a central collector of reputational data, that data 
comes, not only comes from the community, but is also based on a much 
wider array of factors personal to each member of the community. Second, 
while it may have a de facto monopoly over niche markets for auctions,141 
eBay is only one of many large on-line communities. There are 
innumerable social reputation schemes proliferating on the Internet on 
different websites. Social reputation is measured in a variety of ways for 
different purposes. Third, Equifax is the least cost avoider with regard to 
correcting mistakes in a credit report. The report is centrally controlled 
and maintained and based on criteria set by Equifax. While eBay may be 
in the best position to correct Colin’s feedback score, it cannot police his 
feedback in AOL or Slashdot. Fourth, and most important, while 
defamation of credit gives me a right to go against Equifax, in the on-line 
reputation context we need a right for a member of the community to go 
against eBay to safeguard reputation, not only the person whose reputation 
is in question, and not only in the event that reputation is being impugned. 
The law protects the individual investment in goodwill that we make 
when engaging in commerce—social or economic—in order to develop 
personal standing and the other social signaling that is required to engage 
in relationships with strangers. We invent a property right as an incentive 
to publish more information about ourselves in the marketplace. As a 
matter of public policy, we want people to cultivate a good reputation, not 
only to promote good faith and fair dealing, but also in order to encourage 
the dissemination of greater information about people with whom, in an 
atomistic and geographically dispersed society we would not otherwise 
have social dealings. Whereas in the Renaissance one developed so-called 
social capital142 through involvement in civic affairs and in community 
 141. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (granting 
preliminary injunction against auction aggregation site); Oscar Cisneros, EBay Accused of 
Monopolization, WIRED, July 31, 2000, http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,37871,00.html; 
Ina Steiner, eBay/PayPal Acquisition Decision Expected Today, AUCTIONBYTES.COM, Aug. 19, 2002, 
http://www.auctionbytes.com/cab/abn/y02/m08/i19/s01.  
 142. See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 19 (2000). While not the inventor of the term, Robert Putnam is often associated with the 
expression “social capital.” As he writes:  
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life, with the rise of cities and the decline of the mediating institutions of 
social life,143 reputation has been a cornerstone of identity.  
We have therefore become accustomed to “owning” identity.144 
Viewed from this perspective, Colin suffers a harm—measurable property 
damage—when he is deprived of his reputation points or the ability to 
control the disposition of his avatar. But this narrative about how identity 
is constructed does not comport with the reality of identity being, not 
something that we only invest in as individuals, but something that is 
directly socially constructed by the group to a much greater and more 
direct extent in cyberspace than in real space. Colin does not create or 
control his reputation. EBay does not either. Rather the community, by 
means of the new social technologies of reputation systems, is the author 
of Colin’s reputation. An eBay reputation, though measured and displayed 
using facilities provided by eBay, is the product of the eBay marketplace, 
not in some amorphous or indirect sense (i.e. price measures the will of the 
marketplace), but based on the direct aggregation of participant 
preferences and based on criteria selected by the users themselves, not by 
the centralized authority. 
Constitutional values suggest the importance of identity to the 
individual and to society. Copyright law teaches that identity has legally 
cognizable value and reflects original expression and creativity. It also 
gives us the idea of the collective work comprising various underlying 
elements as well as the principles of moral rights that recognize the right 
of the collective in a creative work. Tort law has long recognized the 
importance of identity as a marker of trustworthiness in the marketplace 
and has granted a property right in reputation as an incentive to individual 
investment in identity. Defamation of credit, in particular, recognizes a 
right to safeguard and correct financial reputation information. As we have 
Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to the properties 
of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals—social networks and 
the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital 
is closely related to what some have called “civic virtue.” The difference is that “social 
capital” calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a dense 
network of reciprocal social relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is 
not necessarily rich in social capital. 
Id. 
 143. On the decline of civil society in cities, see generally, RICHARD SENNETT, THE CONSCIENCE 
OF THE EYE: THE DESIGN AND SOCIAL LIFE OF CITIES (1990); LOUIS WIRTH, ON CITIES AND SOCIAL 
LIFE (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. ed., 1964). 
 144. Post, supra note 24, at 694 (“To injure such a reputation without justification is to unjustly 
destroy the results of an individual’s labor. The resulting loss is ‘capable of pecuniary admeasurement’ 
because the value of reputation is determined by the marketplace in exactly the same manner that the 
marketplace determines the cash value of any property loss.”).  
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seen, all of these approaches offer something to solve the dilemma of on-
line reputation. None, by itself, fits well with cyberspatial environments 
where identity is malleable rather than immutable, and where identity is 
“real” rather than fictional, and where the group, rather than the 
individual, creates reputation. 
III. THE TRADEMARK APPROACH 
If we eschew a view of identity that creates the incentive for individual 
investment in reputation, we must look elsewhere in the doctrine for an 
approach to online identity that recognizes the role of the group. The goal 
is not simply to create an incentive for individual investment in the 
production of goodwill but to create an incentive for the collective 
production of such goodwill and disincentives for actions that destroy such 
goodwill. We want to generate more information about identity and 
greater integrity of that information. 
In this Section, I propose that trademark law—coupled with 
constitutional, copyright and tort—affords us even better guidance for how 
to maintain integrity and reliability for online reputation. While personal 
names can function as trademarks,145 I do not propose that trademark law 
can be used as is.146 After all, trademark is intended to make “actionable 
the deceptive and misleading use of marks” and to “protect persons 
 145. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[Rosa Parks’] prior 
commercial activities and international recognition as a symbol of the civil rights movement endow 
her with a trademark interest in her name the same as if she were a famous actor or musician.”); Cf. 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922–23 (6th Cir. 2003) (dismissing claims by golfer 
Tiger Woods against a visual artist, holding that “as a general rule, a person’s image or likeness cannot 
function as a trademark,” but a particular photo or image if used frequently and consistently in the sale 
of particular goods or services may function as a mark); Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 583 
(2d Cir. 1990) (“[A]n individual’s likeness is not a consistently represented fixed image—different 
photographs of the same person may be markedly dissimilar. Thus a photograph of a human being, 
unlike a portrait of a fanciful cartoon character, is not inherently ‘distinctive’ in the trademark sense of 
tending to indicate origin.”) (citation omitted). 
 146. See ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 142 (Stephen 
Heath ed., trans., 1977); Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: 
PERSPECTIVES IN POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141 (Josue V. Harari ed., trans., 1979); Jane C. 
Ginsburg, Essay—The Author’s Name as a Trademark: A Perverse Perspective on the Moral Right of 
« Paternity »? (2005) (Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
4, 2005) [hereinafter Ginsburg, The Author’s Name] (arguing that right of attribution is dead) (this 
essay is based on a translation of Jane C. Ginsburg, Le Nom de L’auteur en Tant que Signe Distinctif: 
Une Perspective Perverse sur le Droit la Paternité des Oeuvres de L’esprit?, in 16 LES CAHIERS DE 
PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE 117 (2004)), available at http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0405.pdf; Jane 
C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063 
(2003).  
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engaged in commerce” against unfair competition.147 This does not 
comport with our purposes, which go beyond commerce and the 
commercial marketplace to include reputation and identity created in a 
wide array of social contexts. Furthermore, trademark law while 
concerned with marks of source, does not, by itself, create a right of 
attribution148 (e.g., a requirement to name the author of an expressive 
representational work) or deal centrally with the issue of personal identity. 
Rather, this Article suggests that we need to think about reputation the 
way we think about brands where the public and the mark’s holder both 
have important interests. Let me be clear at the outset that looking to 
trademark law for guidance with the identity issue does not suggest any 
desire to follow the prevalent trend149 toward greater commodification of 
intellectual property.150 We have been arguing against this property-centric 
notion. But the rights and interests of the group uniquely circumscribe the 
property right in trademark unlike other areas of intellectual property. This 
Article is not advocating, for example, an anti-dilution right in on-line 
identity (e.g., that one may not tarnish reputation through its use by a 
competitor).151 Rather we are looking to the way trademark mediates 
successfully between the interests of the holder and the interests of the 
public in the use and disposition of the mark. On-line reputation functions 
like a trademark, and it is trademark doctrine that may provide the most 
useful, practical indication of how to recognize and respect both Colin’s 
interests and those of the Everquest community in which he built his 
avatar’s identity and the eBay community who created his eBay 
reputation. 
 147. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (quoting 15 U.S.C. 1127 (1988)). 
 148. See Gregory F. Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 3 (working paper, 2005), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=656138 (“Thus, shorn from trademark 
law by Dastar, and ignored by copyright, markings of authorship are generally not protected by the 
two primarily federal laws of intellectual property that would conceivably regulate such marks.”); see 
also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35–36 (2003) (“We do not think 
the Lanham Act requires this search for the source of the Nile and all its tributaries.”). 
 149. According to Christopher Kelty, we live in an “[E]conomy absolutely saturated with 
proprietary forms of ownership.” Christopher Kelty, Trust Among the Algorithms: Ownership, Identity, 
and the Collaborative Stewardship of Information, in CODE, supra note 14, at 127. 
 150. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04 (1984) (finding that trade secrets 
are property subject to Fifth Amendment protection); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 481–
85 (1974) (discussing intersection of state trade secret law and federal patent law); see also Stephen L. 
Carter, Owning What Doesn’t Exist, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99 (1990) (arguing that the non-
tangible quality of trademarks creates difficulties in applying to classic utilitarian analysis); Stephen L. 
Carter, Does it Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993). 
 151. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).  
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A trademark, like on-line identity, is a source identifier. We might 
think of both Colin’s avatar and his eBay rating as trademarks pointing to 
him as a source. Trademark is not concerned with precisely who in the 
“real world” stands behind a mark. The mark may not tell us exactly who 
the person is behind that identifier, but it points to a defined source.  
Trademark law is fine with pseudonyms. A trademark need not be the 
legal name of the entity, simply an identifier as to source of the goods. 
While a trademark is designed to sell goods or services rather than indicate 
authorship in the traditional sense, it both represents the entity standing 
behind the mark and has an independent legal standing as a mark. But the 
mark is not merely a representation of the source; it also ties to reputation. 
The mark signals the goodwill invested in the mark. It is an avatar, 
essentially, that represents the life of a product in the marketplace. It 
operates in a similar vein to signal information and reputation, not simply 
about the product, but about the source of those goods. 
Moreover, a trademark, like on-line identity (and unlike the way we 
typically think about copyright) is created by the public as well as the 
author. The actual mark (representation) may be the invention of the 
trademark’s owner; but the value in a trademark (reputation) is created by 
the public which associates that mark with the source of the goods and a 
quality standard over time. Trademark is the collaborative creation of the 
source, the public and the marketplace.152 A certification mark, even more 
so, is a collaborative creation. Trademarks are developed gradually over 
time through iterative interaction and transactions. While Colin may have 
created the appearance and dreamed up the name for his avatar, or taken 
the steps to set up his account with eBay, the identity he has in both 
spaces—his reputation or feedback rating—is the product of the collective. 
Members of the community who bought or sold from him on eBay took 
the time to give feedback. In many cases, the software automatically 
tabulates reputation based on action or interaction, making judgments 
about reputation on the basis of friendly or unfriendly interactions between 
players.153 Reputation in the blogosphere154 or on Google155 is measured 
 152. See generally Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 
(1999). 
 153. See Second Life social reputation system, supra note 77. Other social networking tools 
calculate reputation based on number of links or number of friends; see also Trust and Reputation in 
Web Based Social Networks, http://trust.mindswap.org/trustProject.shtml (last visited Aug. 26, 2005); 
Web Based Social Network Listing, http://trust.mindswap.org/cgi-bin/relationshipTable.cgi (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2005). 
 154. For information on how Technorati tracks weblogs, see About Technorati, http://www/ 
technorati.com/about (last visited Aug. 27, 2005) (“A few years ago, Web search was revolutionized 
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automatically by the number of links or references, for example. While in 
these systems, “reputation” is essentially equivalent to popularity; and 
reputation can be measured in other ways. Avatars in games, for example, 
have their reputation measured by their rank, title and special powers that 
indicate skill, talent, and expertise. But reputation in games is also 
measured by gaze (e.g., how long I looked at you) as an indicator of 
likeability and popularity. 
This is very similar to the way trademarks operate. It is the public 
whose view is measured in determining whether a mark is distinctive.156 
For descriptive brands that are less obviously distinctive as trademarks, the 
law requires, for example, an explicit showing of secondary meaning (an 
association of the mark with a unique source) among the consuming 
public.157 In other words, the validity of the mark derives, not from the 
actions of the mark’s holder, but also from the minds of the public. Either 
direct evidence in the form of consumer surveys or circumstantial 
evidence of actions on the part of the holder, such as extensive advertising, 
can indicate the state of the mind of the public.158 But the law is not 
fundamentally interested only in the action of the mark’s holder. The 
by a simple but profound idea—that the relevance of a site can be determined by the number of other 
sites that link to it, and thus consider it ‘important.’ In the world of blogs, hyperlinks are even more 
significant, since bloggers frequently link to and comment on other blogs, which creates the sense of 
timeliness and connectedness one would have in a conversation. So Technorati tracks the number of 
links, and the perceived relevance of blogs, as well as the real-time nature of blogging. Because 
Technorati automatically receives notification from weblogs as soon as they are updated, it can track 
the thousands of updates per hour that occur in the blogosphere, and monitor the communities (who’s 
linking to whom) underlying these conversations.”). 
 155. Our Search: Google Technology, Google Page Rank Explained, http://www.google.com/ 
technology/index.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2005). 
 156. See, e.g., Publications Int’l v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 338–39 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.) 
(“The courts have struggled to articulate a standard for when a trade dress is sufficiently distinctive to 
be entitled to the prima facie protection of the Lanham Act.”) (citations omitted); see also Insty*Bit, 
Inc. v. Poly-Tech Industries, Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 672 (8th Cir. 1996); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 
71 F.3d 996, 1008–09 (2d Cir. 1995); Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 
1448–51 (3d Cir. 1994); Dunn v. Gull , 990 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1993); Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. 
Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977). This struggle is mirrored in the district 
judge’s opinion and in the briefs of the parties. But efforts to define intuitive concepts such as 
“distinctiveness” are often both futile and unnecessary. We use with perfect clarity many words that 
we cannot define, such as “time,” “number,” “beauty,” and “law.” Everyone can recognize when a 
product has a “distinctive” appearance, without having been tutored in the meaning of 
“distinctiveness.” 
 157. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). 
 158. Among the factors a court will consider in finding secondary meaning are: “(1) the length 
and manner of its use, (2) the nature and extent of advertising and promotion of the mark and (3) the 
efforts made in the direction of promoting a conscious connection, in the public’s mind, between the 
name or mark and a particular product or venture.” Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 
1218 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 
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public is the sole touchstone of distinctiveness and therefore of validity. 
Marks do not achieve trademark status without further association in the 
mind of the buying public with the source.159  
The same is true for trademark genericide.160 A mark can be rendered 
invalid by the public because of the public’s inability to distinguish 
between the source of the goods and the goods themselves (as provided 
from multiple sources).161 The Lanham Act provides that the test for 
determining whether a registered mark has become generic is what the 
“relevant public”162 thinks, and whether the public, not the trademark 
holder, considers the primary significance of the mark to name the goods 
or services rather than their source.163 Again, as with reputation, the 
touchstone of the mark is its usefulness to the public and that interest 
outweighs that of any individual mark’s “owner.” 
 159. See In re MBNA America Bank, N.A., 340 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Nett 
Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The perception of the relevant purchasing public 
sets the standard for determining descriptiveness.”) (citation omitted). Thus, a mark is merely 
descriptive if the ultimate consumers immediately associate it with a quality or characteristic of the 
product or service. On the other hand, “if a mark requires imagination, thought, and perception to 
arrive at the qualities or characteristics of the goods [or services], then the mark is suggestive.”). Id. 
(citation omitted). 
 160. Genericide is, “[t]he loss or cancellation of a trademark that no longer distinguishes the 
owner’s product from others’ products. Genericide occurs when a trademark becomes such a 
household name that the consuming public begins to think of the mark not as a brand name but as a 
synonym for the product itself. Examples of trademarks that have been ‘killed’ by genericide include 
aspirin and escalator.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 707 (8th ed. 2004). See also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l 
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (shredded wheat); Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 
874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989) (Murphy Bed). 
 161. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3); Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) 
(“[A] registered mark may be canceled at any time on the grounds that it has become generic.”) 
(citation omitted).  
 162. See Nartron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 305 F.3d 397, 406 (6th Cir. 2002) (relevant 
public are “participants in the semiconductor industry including manufacturers, customers, suppliers, 
vendors and the trade and technical press”); Loglan Inst., Inc. v. Logical Language Group, Inc., 962 
F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that where the product is a logical language, the relevant 
public is “the small group of persons who have written about the language or have been involved in 
the invented language research effort as well as those to whom the Loglan language has been or is 
being marketed”); Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1404 (W.D. 
Wash. 2002) ([T]he relevant public consists of all “owners and users of Intel-compatible personal 
computers.”); Capital Project Mgmt., Inc. v. IMDISI, Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172 (T.T.A.B. 
2003) (relevant public for construction scheduling analysis services includes engineers, architects, 
lawyers, construction owners, contractors, and other professionals in the construction management 
field who purchase schedule analysis services, courts, boards of contract appeals, arbitrators, and 
others in the field who read or are concerned with schedule analysis reports). 
 163. See, e.g., In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[I]s 
the term sought to be registered . . . understood by the relevant public primarily to refer to that genus 
of goods or services?”) (quoting H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 
987, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); In re American Academy of Facial Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, 64 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1748 (T.T.A.B. 2002). 
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Similarly, scandalous marks are prohibited as against public policy 
because the public deems them to be so, and because in the social and 
political climate of the time, the marks are judged inappropriate and 
undeserving of the law’s protection. Multiple dictionaries are used to 
determine what the public would consider to be scandalous or immoral.164 
While not the only example, trademark law is an abstraction and 
embodiment of this relationship between the creator and the public, a 
relationship to which the law gives voice. Again, trademark law represents 
the public interest in the mark by means of rules prohibiting scandalous 
marks and circumscribing the holder’s individual property rights. 
The trademark holder cannot freely alienate a trademark. Assignments 
in gross are prohibited by statute.165 As McCarthy writes: “Good will and 
its trademark symbol are as inseparable as Siamese Twins who cannot be 
separated without death to both. A trademark has no independent 
significance apart from the good will it symbolizes.”166 So even though a 
trademark may be considered property, it is not the right of the holder or 
“owner” unilaterally to dispose of that mark as he wishes. That limitation 
includes preventing so-called naked licenses, the severing of the mark 
from its goodwill. Coca-Cola cannot give its hugely valuable brand to 
Joe’s Cola without transferring assets or exercising some kind of quality 
control. Because trademarks play a signaling function to the public, the 
public interest limits the property right and gives rise to the rule against 
naked licenses. 
As intellectual property scholar Steven Wilf points out, the 
fundamental truth about trademark—not just a collective mark—is that 
marks are collectively authored. They are the product of the community. 
This notion of collective authorship of the trademark, says Wilf, while a 
central feature of trademark law and how trademarks operate in reality, is 
often obscured by the liberal approach we adopt to describe the incentive 
 164. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (refusing registration to “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter”); In 
re Boulevard Entertainment Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In a case such as this one, in 
which multiple dictionaries, including at least one standard dictionary, uniformly indicate that a word 
is vulgar, and the applicant’s use of the word is clearly limited to the vulgar meaning of the word, . . . 
the PTO can sustain its burden of showing that the mark comprises or consists of scandalous matter by 
reference to dictionary definitions alone. In such instances, although other evidence, such as consumer 
surveys, would no doubt be instructive, the PTO’s finding is not legally insufficient because of the 
absence of such evidence.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 165. 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a) (2000); see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Stadium 
Auth. of Pittsburgh, 479 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (“there are no rights in a trademark alone, and 
‘no rights can be transferred apart from the business with which the mark is associated.’”) (citation 
omitted). 
 166. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:2 
(4th ed. 1996). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1733 Noveck book pages.doc7/24/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1776 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1733 
 
 
 
 
 
 
theory of trademarks. “Thus, a major concern is that both the personality 
theory and Lockean paradigms begin with the premise that through sole 
creation of the trademark, its holder has established ownership. In the 
original position, according to these models, all property rights belong to 
the trademark holder.”167 As Wilf makes clear in his essay, the “public 
authorship model” is more accurate of what is actually taking place.168 “It 
is the collective personality of culture that participates in the authorship of 
trademarks and that act of collective labor establishes a stake to trademark 
symbolism contemporaneous with any private claims.”169  
Most importantly, the law recognizes public rights in and to the 
trademark. Building on Wilf’s contentions about trademark, I want to 
reinforce the claim that on-line reputation, even more than trademark, is 
not the property of an individual. We need to start thinking about on-line 
reputation as a “brand” or a type of trademark that enables social 
transactions in specific online marketplaces or communities. While one 
creator can have multiple marks or identities, each one must remain 
consistent and authentic. That is not to say that they have to be authentic 
vis-à-vis the real world person. Rather they have to be consistent within 
that social network or community. Having a pseudonymous identity, 
different from one’s “real world” identity is perfectly consistent with the 
way trademarks function, too.170 In trademark doctrine, the public does not 
need to know the name of the source of a product, merely that the product 
comes from a specific source. Similarly, we need to shift attention from 
the “problem” of piercing the veil between the on-line person and the 
“real” person. Instead, thinking about identity as a mark focuses on 
creating robust reputation online independent of off-line data. 
In sum, the trademark paradigm, more so than copyright, constitutional 
or tort law makes sense in terms of the comparable way trademark and 
reputation function and in terms of the way trademark law and policy 
 167. Wilf, supra note 152, at 4. 
 168. See Wilf, supra note 152, at 1 (“By associating a symbol with an object, the public 
contributes to the authorship of trademarks. This associative power grants a word or icon meaning as 
the representation of a particular object.”); see also Peter Jaszi, Who Cares Who Wrote 
‘Shakespeare’?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 617 (1988).  
 169. Wilf, supra note 152, at 4–5.  
 170. See Ginsburg, The Author’s Name, supra note 146, at 9 (“The « author » who enjoys her 
public’s loyalty is merely a construct designed to hide the true identity of the creator. A sometimes 
necessary falsehood, for example in the 19th century, to deceive publishers regarding the author’s sex. 
Nonetheless, the pseudonym is perfectly consistent with trademark law, because it is indeed the brand 
name under which the creator offers her works. From the point of view of trademark law, the relevant 
information is the name under which the product is sold, whether or not an actual person bears this 
name.”). 
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safeguard the interests of the public and the mark’s source. While many 
different areas of law touch and concern the legal treatment of identity, the 
fact that new social software transforms the construction of identity and 
reputation from an individual into an explicitly group process points the 
way towards trademark as the most apropos legal protection. It is 
trademark law that we turn to for an appropriate legal analogy, reasoning 
from trademark law to think through how we ought to deal legally with 
on-line reputation.  
IV. THE TRADEMARK THEORY OF IDENTITY: APPLYING TRADEMARK 
LAW TO ON-LINE REPUTATION 
As we have seen, identity in cyberspace is fashioned differently than in 
real space yet it plays an equally important role in cementing trust and 
supporting social relationships. Three distinct entities shape that identity: 
the person described, the creator of the software that measures the identity 
and the community which does the work of rating and ranking and making 
use of the information. When we speak of identity, we refer to two distinct 
phenomena. Identity comprises both representation and reputation. 
Representation, often now in graphical form, can be highly malleable, and 
we want to be able to take advantage of the flexibility cyberspace affords 
to change our appearance and be free of the burdens that physical 
embodiment imposes in real life. Reputation, however, needs to be 
persistent. This does not mean we need to tie online identity to the same 
physical, real world person. Nor do we have to have the same reputation 
across all our communities online. In cyberspace we can play different 
roles in myriad social groups. We can spend a few minutes programming 
for an open source software project, chatting on a political message board, 
participating in a collaborative wiki drafting project and helping to build a 
visual map and oral history of a community. The challenge is to create 
persistence and transparency with regard to our identity within each of 
these groups in order to strengthen the bonds of trust and promote 
accountability. 
Before we proceed to discuss the application of law to on-line 
reputation, we must first discuss why profit-seeking firms do not deliver 
the group interests in reputation. Why do we need law at all? Is not the 
platform owner like eBay in the best position to safeguard reputation for 
the community? Does it not possess the requisite incentives? What after all 
are likely to be the practical problems impeding the successful flourishing 
of on-line reputation? 
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The private marketplace offers the software to create feedback and 
reputation-building mechanisms. In order to foster the trust that promotes 
commercial transactions, eBay wants to offer a buyer-seller rating system 
as well as dispute resolution services. In order to promote more book 
purchases, Amazon wants to use collaborative filtering to create 
trustworthy recommendations. In order to encourage people to spend time 
on their platforms, any one of a number of online service providers, such 
as a videogame producer, will increasingly provide the tools to help 
groups manage roles through reputation. An incentive exists for the 
service provider to offer these reputation-building tools. 
Missing are the protections necessary to create an incentive for users of 
these platforms to avail themselves of the tools provided. First, reputation 
systems, while used by the community, are designed according to the 
reputational criteria set by the service provider. There needs to be 
alternative, open and interoperable means for creating reputation 
according to the criteria of the group. This may require the ability to gain 
access to data about interactions within user communities in order to 
enable these sorts of third-party reputation systems. The community needs 
the data stream about itself in order to measure reputation in the ways that 
it finds most useful. Perhaps our group does not want to measure 
reputation based on gaze. Instead, we want to do the work of measuring 
reputation based on more affirmative criteria that we, not the platform 
owner, determine. Or we may simply want to use third-party tools to 
create visualizations or maps based on reputation. This will require having 
access to data streams that the company has no incentive to provide. 
Second, we may want to allow our reputation to be portable from one 
platform to another. I want to allow people into my group on AOL who 
have a certain eBay or Slashdot rating. We need to ensure that those 
reputational ratings are not propertized to prevent their portability. Third, 
we may need to require a right of correction for personal reputation in the 
online spaces to which we belong. If we accept that there will be 
automatic and inescapable reputation-tracking from which we cannot opt 
out, then we must have a right to correct mistakes. This can be a costly and 
complicated endeavor, which there is no incentive to provide. Finally, we 
need ways to ensure, for the group, transparency of reputational 
information.171 If I am to be accorded a reputational score, I ought to know 
what the criteria are so I can choose my online spaces based on the way 
 171. Randall Stross, Trying to Get a Read on Amazon’s Books, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at B3 
(describing shareholder dissatisfaction with Amazon.com’s secretive business practices). 
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reputation is tabulated in that space. One on-line virtual world space, for 
example, has been reported to have turned over those who behave badly to 
the FBI.172 The mechanisms for calculating reputation should be 
transparent. 
These rights in reputation will not be protected by the private sector 
alone. Companies have every incentive to provide reputation systems but 
to assert total ownership in them by means of the terms of service contract. 
Our current legal approach to identity would allow companies to use the 
end user license agreement to enforce rights in reputation regardless of the 
interests of the group or the individual being rated. 
Trademark theory—combined with the lessons of constitutional, 
copyright and tort law—gives us an alternative way to make sense of the 
landscape of online identity. It teaches that we need to be concerned with 
protecting the rights and interests of the collective in the mark and serving 
the interests of the group, not only the individual “owner.”  
Thinking through the legal incentives for the social construction of 
identity is a hard and complex task in a dynamic and ever-changing 
technological environment. But trademark theory gives us a set of 
principles for managing screen names, handles, avatars, reputation scores, 
feedback points, and the evolving social software technologies we have 
yet to develop. Under this approach, we are able to construct two boxes 
into which to sort these socio-technical artifacts. One box is filled with 
those things that facilitate only individual selection of identity, including 
virtual representation. The other box, which this approach illuminates, is 
filled with those aspects of online life, including social reputation that 
should be subject to trademark-like strictures that protect the interests of 
the group. 
Let us look back at Colin’s problem and see how the trademark theory 
of identity would help us in thinking about the two questions posed earlier. 
If Colin had taken his case to court (with someone else as his lawyer), 
what should the court have done? How should a judge, if cognizant of 
trademark principles, have ruled on his two questions: as between Colin 
and Sony over the sale of his avatar on eBay and as between Colin and 
eBay over the deletion of his account and reputation points. Another way 
to ask this is: what rights should any of us have in our avatars and our 
eBay reputation points?173  
 172. Second Life is reported to be submitting the names of malicious users to the FBI. See, e.g., 
Daniel Terdiman, ‘Second Life’ Turns Attacker in to FBI, CNET NEWS, Dec. 15, 2005, 
http://news.com.com/2061-10797_3-5997330.html. 
 173. Or how about your Michelin stars? Who controls those—Michelin or the restaurant? 
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The judge, applying a new common law doctrine of on-line reputation, 
would have found that Colin, Sony and eBay had each been in the wrong 
in its prescription for the desired outcome. 
Colin was wrong to think that he alone should control the destiny of his 
avatar. The graphical representation of his character is Colin’s creation. 
Yet it drew from templates offered by the creator of the game. The 
community played no role in the choice of representation nor did the game 
limit Colin’s ability to change his representation. The appearance of the 
avatar was mutable and should be. Trust in online environments is not 
based on physical appearance, which is the sole creation of the individual, 
not the group and therefore there is no reason to invalidate the terms of 
service. Colin created the avatar in the context of game play and subject to 
a contract with Sony Online Entertainment. Sony has a right to impose 
conditions on its players by contract. That contract prohibited sale—
perhaps in part for the purpose of preserving stable identity. Users desiring 
to join communities that allow avatar sales should find and join them. 
Colin believed that his avatar belonged only to him with no rights accruing 
to any other party.174 But the graphical representation of his character was 
personal intellectual property subject to ownership by Colin and 
assignment to Sony. 
Under a trademark theory, representation should be easy to change; 
reputation should not. The individual controls representation while the 
community controls reputation. Hence, we should stop thinking in terms 
of “rights of avatars” and focus on rights in reputation. Consider an on-line 
group whose aim is to stage a protest or organize a movement or sell a 
product. Within that group, one “person” may be the leader, another the 
treasurer, a third the manifesto-writer. These are social roles that may be 
inhabited by the same physical person over time, but different people may 
also take them on. A speechwriter comes and goes. Someone leaves the 
group and is replaced by someone else. Four people may share the job of 
treasurer. What we want to keep consistent is the measure of the reputation 
Apparently, a dispute is brewing in France between restaurateurs and the venerated guidebook. “But 
while some chefs say that stars no longer matter to them, Michelin says that it alone controls its stars.” 
Elaine Sciolino, Whose Stars Are They Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2005, at F6. 
 174. This is reminiscent of the incident on the on-line community, The Well, where a member 
committed suicide and before doing so wrote a script to delete all evidence of his existence, including 
every posting or thread ever made. The debate raged after his death whether he had a right to “delete 
himself” from the community or whether the community had the right to preserve its own history. 
Katie Hafner, The Epic Saga of the Well, WIRED MAGAZINE, May 1997, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/5.05/ff_well_pr.html; see also the Introduction in HOWARD 
RHEINGOLD, VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING THE VIRTUAL FRONTIER (1994), available at 
http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/intro.html. 
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of “The Treasurer” over time. We want to track reputation by role. We 
may also care—such as in the case of online dating—about the identity of 
the real life person underneath. But in other contexts this is irrelevant.175 
Colin as an eBay seller may, in the real world be “Colin Hepburn,” but it 
may also be Colin’s mother using his account. That means, Colin should 
have the right to change or kill the graphical representation of his avatar 
(subject to conditions imposed on him as a term of service or a rule of the 
game) but not to extinguish its reputation. 
At the same time, Sony was wrong insofar as it disregarded any interest 
the Everquest community may have had in the reputation that 
accompanied Colin’s avatar just as eBay could not disregard the interests 
of its community, as we will discuss. Sony was also misguided to think 
that its intellectual property rights gave it the right to dictate to another 
marketplace what its terms and conditions should be. This was incorrect. 
Sony had the right to create a game where characters could not be 
transferred. But it did not have the right to dictate rules to the eBay 
community so as to interfere with the integrity of reputation. The 
trademark theory of identity suggests that to enable netizens to participate 
in a variety of groups, we focus on maintaining integrity and persistence 
within marketplaces and communities, not necessarily across them. While 
the DMCA gave Sony the legal tool by which to force eBay’s hand, upon 
review, this practice should be deemed contrary to public policy and 
detrimental to the right of reputation. 
EBay was also wrong insofar as it might have believed that it had the 
right to terminate Colin’s reputation and feedback points or to vindicate 
Everqest’s rules (as opposed to violation of its own eBay rules). Taking 
down the auction was a response to the DMCA but canceling Colin’s 
account was not. Either way, as a condition of service, it had the right to 
control Colin’s account but not to delete his reputation. Those feedback 
points were created by and belonged to the eBay community. It was the 
creation of that group and served like a trademark as a signal to the eBay 
community about Colin-as-eBay-member. Since the goal is to create 
incentives to information sharing about the role someone adopts in a social 
context, regardless of whether one or one thousand or a computer stands 
behind that role, eBay cannot terminate reputation created by the group as 
a result of violating a rule in another community. 
 175. See, e.g., Rob Walker, Double Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 5, 2006, at 29 (cyber-
athletes receive medals for competitive performance in on-line games though they may be utterly 
unskilled in real world sport). 
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Thinking about reputation as trademark also means that eBay must help 
to ensure persistence of identity. This means that eBay should not only 
have the right but the obligation to adjust and fix problems with the 
reputation systems that it sets up. If it controls the technology that controls 
reputation, it needs to be able to correct and fix mistakes and undo abuses 
and corruption of the system, where possible. It needs to enforce the rules 
of its own system. Companies providing the facilities for the creation of 
social reputation rankings and scores must provide a right of informational 
redress to remedy errors and correct inaccuracies. Let me propose that we 
can take a page from the defamation of credit doctrine, which requires the 
rating agencies to correct problems with credit scores and misreported 
financial information. We need rules, I would suggest, to administer the 
preservation, correction and deletion of online identity to prevent abuse. 
This does not require a central registry. Rather, it means having 
transparent and clearly defined criteria that produce greater information 
about the meaning and measure of given forms of identity within defined 
groups.  
If we reason from the perspective of trademark law, neither Everquest 
nor eBay has an absolute right to extinguish accurate, past informational 
data that is created by and valuable to the community as a whole without 
good cause. This is not because on-line identity is like property or like 
personhood, but because, like trademark, on-line identity serves a social 
signaling function to reduce confusion and increase the trust that is 
essential for social interaction. Online identity, while important to us as 
individuals—we care about our avatars—serves a central social function. 
“Information about the individual helps to define the situation, enabling 
others to know in advance what he will expect of them and what they may 
expect of him. Informed in these ways, the others will know how best to 
act in order to call forth a desired response from him.”176 The public plays 
a role in constructing reputational identity. Members of the social groups 
to which we belong have an overriding interest in seeing it maintained, not 
to the detriment of our ability to adopt new social roles and voluntarily 
take on new representations of identity, but to ensure transparency, 
openness, and consistency. 
Even if eBay decides to terminate the real-world-Colin’s contract of 
service, it needs to preserve online-Colin’s reputation and make that 
information available. But why, we may ask, does Colin need a reputation 
score on eBay, if he is no longer a participant in that marketplace? After 
 176. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1 (1959). 
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all, trademark permits abandonment of a mark. But trademark does not 
expunge the record or the registry when a mark is abandoned. Other 
informational systems may rely on online reputation to create a cross-
community reputational record. If, as in many communities, accounts can 
be transferred or sold or given away then we need to maintain information 
about the reputation associated with that role. That information needs to be 
interoperable and portable. 
While trademark concerns reputation in the marketplace, on-line 
identity concerns reputation in a potentially unlimited number of social 
groups in which we are embedded. We may have a different reputation on 
eBay as a seller than we do in Match.com as a dater. Within each 
community, there needs to be transparency of rating criteria so that all 
parties understand the meaning of reputation. I ought to be able to know 
what it means to have a “5467” on eBay versus 4-stars from Amazon. We 
need to evolve norms of making the rating criteria of social reputation 
software transparent.  
These rating criteria need to be open and non-proprietary to enable 
third parties to compare identities across social reputation systems and to 
develop tools to help make reputation manifest via the screen. No 
intellectual property rights should be asserted in social reputation 
software, taxonomies, or metrics in such a way as to prevent a third party 
from creating a graph of eBay sellers based on reputation. Those providing 
the facilities and tools for the calculation of social reputation should not be 
able to assert intellectual property rights in social reputation practices, 
processes, or methods. Social reputation is a fundamental building block 
of social interaction and it must be kept free, open and transparent if we 
are to build a new society online. This will help to encourage the 
development of more and enhanced visualizations of reputation that help 
us to understand reputation better via the screen and the growth of third-
party reputation trustees. 
Finally, the practice of branding and visual representation of 
corporation identity suggests that we ought to evolve better ways of using 
the screen to make reputation manifest. This is not the same as a set of 
rules dictating transparency. Rather, we need a set of design principles—
informal norms—that push towards showing reputation on the screen and 
helping the public to make sense of reputation within communities. At the 
same time, reputational data streams about interaction and behavior need 
to be available to members of communities to manipulate in order to make 
reputation more available, transparent and visible to the group. 
Trademark can guide us in thinking about Colin’s problems; problems 
that are increasingly common as we evolve more social cyberspaces. How 
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we apply these values in the online reputation context is complicated and 
will require a far greater degree of attention and understanding of how 
reputation is formed online. But we now have a set of legal principles by 
which to understand social interaction in these socio-technical 
environments. The trademark theory of reputation enables us to make 
social trust a normative goal once again by giving us the right interpretive 
approaches for strengthening identity in online communities. 
V. CONCLUSION: WHY ON-LINE IDENTITY MATTERS 
There is a lot at stake in getting the rules of on-line identity right. 
Social interaction depends on the development of ongoing relationships of 
trust.177 Trust is formed through iterative interaction that gives rise to 
shared values and norms.178 Identity—specifically reputation179—is a 
marker of this trust. We do not need to know people in the sense of having 
their street address or a legal name, but we do need to have settled 
expectations about those with whom we are dealing and what role they 
play in the social network of which we are a part in order for us to engage 
in productive interaction. Solving the challenge of identity in cyberspace is 
part of the larger question of addressing how we create trust without face-
to-face interactions.180 While identity is also central to the disciplinary 
inquiries of philosophy, psychology and literature, the legal dimension of 
identity is focused on ensuring that the rules of identity help to promote 
the trust that is at the root of stable and peaceful social interaction.  
Strengthening online identity is central, not simply to the stories we tell 
about ourselves, but to the stories we tell about each other. This does not 
imply a normative shift to a communitarian view of how identity is 
constructed for us by others or an abandonment of liberal notions of free 
will in choosing our identities. To the contrary, cyberspace permits greater 
 177. See Socialphysics.org, http://socialphysics.org. 
 178. See Noveck, supra note 10. 
 179. See Post, supra note 24, at 692–93 (“The common law, as a rule, has ‘not attempted to define 
reputation.’ The dictionary describes it as the ‘common or general estimate of a person with respect to 
character or other qualities.’ Reputation thus inheres in the social apprehension that we have of each 
other. In one sense, of course, virtually all of our social relationships consist of such apprehension, and 
it is not clear what it would mean for them all to be ‘protected’ by defamation law. But by looking 
carefully at the nature of the ‘injuries affecting a man’s reputation or good name’ defamation law is 
actually designed to redress, one can uncover a more focused image of the exact kinds of social 
apprehension that defamation law considers ‘normal,’ or ‘desirable,’ or deserving of the law’s 
protection. In this sense defamation law presupposes an image of how people are tied together, or 
should be tied together, in a social setting. As this image varies, so will the nature of the reputation that 
the law of defamation seeks to protect.”) (citation omitted). 
 180. See Kelty, supra note 149, at 128. 
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freedom in the voluntary assumption of identity at the same time as it 
involves the relevant public in “thickening” our identity with reputation 
and making it useful and meaningful for social interaction. It is the group 
or the community—not unlike a rating agency offline—that creates 
reputation.181 Hence my concern is not with the human psychology and 
philosophy of identity as it impacts us as individuals. Rather, my approach 
to identity recognizes the way technology is changing how we engage in 
social interactions and the role the law must play as a mediating institution 
in fostering the trust necessary for robust social interchange and collective 
action. Naturally, this has salutary individual effects on personal autonomy 
and freedom. But, and I cannot stress this enough, strengthening reputation 
helps us to be more effective182 in groups and to create and maintain the 
kind of purposive groups that cyberspace might allow. 
The legal doctrine of on-line reputation should focus, not on individual 
property rights in identity, but on creating the necessary incentives for 
healthy and useful reputation systems that promote social trust. We need 
to recognize the work of the group and the interest of the group in these 
collective measures of reputation that force more information out into the 
open. In much the same way as we rely on professional groups to certify 
the reputations of their professionals—experts in a given social context—
we rely increasingly on ranking, rating and reputation offered by 
communities in myriad online communities. We want to promote the kind 
of self-regulatory yet transparent mechanisms that these groups use to 
determine reputation based on merit, rather than for example, race or 
social standing that are irrelevant to determinations of identity within that 
social context.  
This is where trademark doctrine comes into play. Unlike other 
doctrinal approaches that focus on who “owns” identity, trademark offers 
to help us determine who has the right to do what with collectively created 
ascriptions of reputation in online communities. Again, this is not to focus 
 181. See Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common 
Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 1009 (1989) (“Rule found that attempts to limit the access of such 
organizations to personal information in the name of privacy were invariably transformed into 
requirements that such organizations ensure the accuracy and instrumentally appropriate use of such 
information. This transformation ultimately rested on the unimpeachable assumption that organizations 
could reach better, more precise decisions with greater information, and on the more questionable 
assumption that ‘both organizations and individuals shared an interest in [this] enhanced efficiency.’”) 
(citing JAMES B. RULE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY (1980). 
 182. See Masum & Zhang, supra note 26. Better reputation systems will help with assessing and 
filtering content, finding others who share a passion, generating local and global reputation to provide 
feedback that encourages increasing competence levels and in motivating the development of our 
leisure tastes to move beyond passive consumption to actively broadening our horizons. Id. 
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on the trademark as property but on the way, as Steven Wilf has argued, 
that trademark mediates between the interests of the creator of the mark 
and the public which depends upon its signaling properties. This requires 
establishing a legal framework for greater transparency of on-line identity 
and social reputation metrics, preventing the monopolization of these 
metrics through intellectual property law and limiting the rights of any one 
party to extinguish reputational records while ensuring the flexibility and 
malleability of representation in online spaces. While we have genuine 
legal concerns in certain contexts about piercing the veil between on-line 
and off-line identity, these concerns cannot constitute the right legal 
framework to make on-line identity meaningful and robust. If I want a 
loosely-knit group to be able to accomplish a project, achieve a goal, or 
open a bank account183 by collaborating, I have to be able to divvy up roles 
within the group. In order to define expectations for social interaction 
online, identity must not be subject to the whim of private entities and a 
contractual rule that says past reputational data can be erased at any point. 
Hence, we need to protect reputation of online identity differently than we 
have thus far treated representation. 
As more of our lives move on-line184 and we develop significant 
emotional attachments in these social spaces,185 it is inevitable that we 
need to reconsider who we are and who we want to be in these new 
metaverses. Arguably, we want to increase human autonomy by making it 
easier to assume identity independent of our offline identity. We also want 
to accord ourselves greater flexibility in assuming the social roles 
necessary to engage in cooperative work. Strengthening identity builds 
trust and enables collective action and sociability. 
While we are in the process of developing the technical architecture 
and tools to support persistent identity in cyberspace,186 we need, in 
 183. See generally Noveck & Johnson, supra note 63.  
 184. See Susan Kuchinskas, Earth to Virtual Earth, INTERNETNEWS.COM, May 24, 2005, 
http://www.internetnews.com/xSP/article.php/3507236 (regarding a recent MSN project about “deeply 
immersive” data searching tied to location, in which “[u]sers will be able to map a particular location 
and then search local listings for businesses nearby. Eventually, according to the demonstration, they’ll 
be able to click on a listing and get more information about the business.”). 
 185. See Balkin, supra note 103, at 74 (“Although leaving the virtual community for a new one or 
creating a new identity are technically available options, they may not be a sufficient remedy if people 
invest a great deal of time and energy in creating their in-world personas, and highly value their 
participation in the virtual community. In general, the more important that virtual worlds become to 
people, and the more time and effort they invest in them, the more likely the law will take seriously 
injuries to their in world reputation as well as their in world possessions.”). 
 186. See John Clippinger’s project on social physics at the The Berkman Center for Internet & 
Society at Harvard Law School, The Social Physics Project, http://socialphysics.org/ (last visited July 
11, 2005).  
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parallel, to create the right legal framework. If we do not solve the 
problem of how to treat on-line identity from a legal standpoint, we cannot 
take advantage of the software’s potential to create digital institutions.187 
While in real space, we turn to legal institutions, such as courts, mediators, 
corporate structures, and other vehicles to create the necessary 
infrastructure to manage social relations, the hope is that in cyberspace we 
can make it simpler, cheaper, and more efficient for people to engage in 
collective action across a distance. This requires us to support newly 
emerging social software188 with the appropriate legal rules that establish 
clear rights in on-line identity. Without a law of identity appropriate to the 
new material and technological environment in which we live, we impede 
our ability to use the screen to create social groups and foster the means 
for collective action. 
If I am not for myself, who will be for me? Yet, identity especially 
online, is not purely an individual construct. It is inherently the work of 
the group. If I am only for myself, what am I? Instead, we can collectively 
and collaboratively assume roles within different social contexts. I can be 
a buyer here and a seller there. I am a CEO in one group and a worker in 
another group. Here I contribute information. There I critique others. We 
have the technology, now we just need the legal framework to realize 
opportunities for creating rich forms of identity and transforming 
cyberspace from a place for me into a place for us. If not now, when?189 
 187. See Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Analyzing the Economic Efficiency of eBay-Like Online 
Reputation Reporting Mechanisms (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4181-01, 2001), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=289968, (“The production of trust is an important requirement for 
forming and growing open online trading communities.”). 
 188. See SUSAN P. CRAWFORD & DAVID R. JOHNSON, ESSAYS ON NETIZENSHIP (work in 
progress, on file with author); Noveck & Johnson, supra note 63. 
 189. “If I am not for myself, who will be for me; if I am only for myself, what am I; if not now 
when?” This famous aphorism is generally attributed to Hillel, the Jewish sage and contemporary of 
Jesus. 
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